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The Last Legally Beaten Servant in America: From 
Compulsion to Coercion in the American Workplace1 
Lea VanderVelde2 
A master may by law correct his apprentice or servant . . . .3 
     – Blackstone’s Commentaries 
The relation of master and slave begins in violence; it must be sus-
tained by violence—the systematic violence of general laws, or the 
irregular violence of individual caprice.4 
– Theodore Parker, 1830 
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 1. This piece is intended both as a free standing article and as a chapter in a book that I have 
had in mind for many years, entitled The Master Narrative of the Nineteenth Century. In that book, I 
proceed by isolating and examining different privileges and prerogatives of the master-servant rela-
tion. My article, The Legal Ways of Seduction, 48 STAN. L. REV 817 (1996) [hereinafter 
VanderVelde, Legal Ways] concerns the writ of seduction. My article, The Gendered Origins of the 
Lumley Doctrine: Binding Men’s Consciences and Women’s Fidelity, 101 YALE L.J. 775 (1992) 
[hereinafter VanderVelde, Gendered Origins] concerns negative specific performance. This piece 
addresses violent chastisement and corporal punishment. 
 2. Lea VanderVelde is the Josephine Witte Professor of Law at the University of Iowa. She has 
authored a number of articles on the subject of free labor, beginning with The Labor Vision of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437 (1989) [hereinafter VanderVelde, Labor Vision]. I 
would like to thank Jim Sheets, Robert Post, Alan Hyde, Reva Siegel, Jack Balkin, and Mary Anne 
Case for their comments on this piece. This Article was begun so long ago that these commentators 
may have forgotten having read it, but I remember with gratitude their having done so.   
I am particularly indebted to the excellent research assistance of Alexandria Ransom. I also thank 
Tom Gallanis and the participants of the Iowa Legal Studies Workshop. 
 3. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *416. 
 4. THEODORE PARKER, Condition and Treatment of Slaves, in 5 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
THEODORE PARKER 30, 31 (Francis Power Cobbe ed., 1863). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Historically, the law of master-servant allowed corporal punish-
ment. Today it seems strange to contemplate that intentionally inflicted 
violence was ever an acceptable method of compelling workers to labor 
in America. Strange as it seems, the practice of striking servants to disci-
pline them was considered a legitimate, implicit part of the relationship 
between masters and servants.5 Servants, as well as slaves, could be sub-
jected to cuffings and even severe beatings as means of “correction” and 
compulsion to labor.6 Menial servants, apprentices, and domestic serv-
                                                     
 5. The master’s right to chastise his servants was widely cited in nineteenth-century American 
treatises. See treatises cited infra note 8. Only the highest level of service providers, professional 
men, were excluded from the group who could be subjected to chastisement. 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *410–20. “Servants” could include anyone 
who is employed to render personal services to his employer, otherwise than in the pur-
suit of an independent calling, and who, in such service, remains entirely under the con-
trol and direction of the latter, who is called his master.’ The term “servant” includes, not 
only menial and domestic servants, but all other employés [sic] who are hired or who 
volunteer to perform services for their employer, and who remain under his direction and 
control during the time for which they are hired. Thus, it includes a bookkeeper or clerk 
in a business office, a salesman in a shop, railroad employés [sic], workmen in factories, 
etc. All such employés [sic] are subject to the law governing the relation of master and 
servant. 
WALTER C. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 454 (1896). 
 6. See Evelyn Atkinson, Out of the Household: Master-Servant Relations and Employer Liabil-
ity Law, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 205, 219 (2013) (citing SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF 
NATURE AND NATIONS 614 (Basil Kennett trans., J. Walthoe, R. Wilkin, J. & J. Bonwicke, S. Birt, 
T. Ward & T. Osborne, 1729) (1672)) (“[P]ufendorf wrote in 1710 that a master may ‘correct [his 
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ants could be beaten with hands, fists, straps, sticks, and sometimes 
whips, all in the name of correction and chastisement.7 Children and 
wives could also be subject to corporal punishment.8 Certainly there were 
varying degrees of beating deemed appropriate for different statuses of 
dependent persons within the household—a slap was the slightest, whip-
pings were severe—yet our legal system authorized the master to impose 
corporal punishment on all persons subservient to him. Some early stat-
utes even shored up this prerogative by holding a master harmless for 
injuries done to his servants while in the act of “correcting” them.9 
                                                                                                                       
servants’] . . . by such Methods of Severity as are most likely to prevail on their particular Disposi-
tions.”). 
 7. See id. at 219. As written in the 1618 treatise Country Justice, “the master may strike his 
servant with his hand, fist, small staffe, or stick, for correction: and though he do draw bloud [sic] 
thereby, yet it seemeth no breach of peace” provided “hee doth it not outragiously [sic].” Id. (quoting 
ROBERT STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH 
AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350–1870, at 78 (2002) (quoting MICHAEL DALTON, THE 
COUNTRY JUSTICE (1618)). 
 For purposes of this Article, I will refer to all of these actions of striking employees as “work-
place corporal punishment.” 
 8. See, e.g., Iowa v. Bitman, 13 Iowa 485, 486 (1862). In a case where a parent was charged 
with assault and battery for “inhumanly whipping and beating his own child,” the court noted that it 
is “the right of a parent to chastise his child, but . . . where . . . the parent or master goes beyond the 
line of reasonable correction, his conduct becomes more or less criminal.” Id. 
 By 1853, some states were heeding the “more progressive rule.” Cooper v. Mcjunkin, 4 Ind. 
290, 293 (1853) (“The husband can no longer moderately chastise his wife; nor, according to the 
more recent authorities, the master his servant or apprentice. Even the degrading cruelties of the 
naval service have been arrested. Why the person of the school-boy . . . should be less sacred in the 
eye of the law than that of the apprentice or the sailor, is not easily explained. . . . Admitting the right 
to chastise moderately, it does not follow that a choleric schoolmaster will be justified in beating and 
cutting the head and face of a wayward boy with any weapons his passions may supply.”). 
 For another example of how women and children can be punished, see Dix v. Martin, 157 S.W. 
133, 136 (Mo. App. 1913). The court ruled against Martin for assaulting a minor who lived with 
Martin as a servant with her guardian’s permission. Martin argued that the girl’s subordinate position 
as a child rendered the relationship that of parent and child, and hence, the assault was warranted. 
The court found that in this case the guardian’s grant of permission for Dix to live with Martin did 
not change his position to that of one standing “in loco parentis” to the child and was instead the 
“relation of master and servant.” As such, the court stated that “a master has no authority to chastise 
his servant, no matter how flagrant his violation of duty may be.” Id. (citing 2 AMERICAN AND 
ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Law 965 (David S. Garland & Lucius P. McGehee eds., 2d ed. 1896)). 
 See generally H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (1877) [here-
inafter WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT]; H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND 
SERVANT COVERING THE RELATION, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES 82 
(San Francisco, Bancroft-Whitney Co. 2d ed. 1886) [hereinafter WOOD, RELATION, DUTIES, AND 
LIABILITIES]; CHARLES MANLEY SMITH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (Phil-
adelphia, The Blackstone Publishing Co. 1852); IRVING BROWNE, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS AND OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYED (Boston, Charles C. Soule 1890); 
TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME, OF PARENT AND CHILD, OF GUARDIAN AND 
WARD, OF MASTER AND SERVANT, AND OF THE POWERS OF THE COURTS OF CHANCERY (New Ha-
ven, Oliver Steele 1816). 
 9. “A law of 1668, entitled ‘An act about the casuall [sic] killing of slaves,’ declares that if the 
slave shall die from the correction, the master shall not be considered guilty of felony; and one of 
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In sharp contrast, the common law has always considered non-
consensual intentional touching to be tortious. A battery occurs when one 
person touches another to even the slightest degree, Blackstone wrote.10 
Yet, Blackstone added that there was an exception specifically for serv-
ants.11 The existence of an employment relationship authorized the mas-
ter to strike a servant with the very intention of inflicting pain. Masters 
held a right of chastisement over everyone under their dominion, includ-
ing those who lived in their households or worked for them.12 Together, 
the authorization in one chapter and this exception to tort doctrine in an-
other, constitute Blackstone’s rule on corporal punishment of servants. 
Yet servants could never strike their masters. There is no more graphic 
indicia of legal asymmetry than a rule that authorizes the dominant actor 
to strike the subordinate and forbids the subordinate from fighting back.13 
This Article will explore the demise of Blackstone’s rule in the le-
gal discourse, examining its transformation, and situating that transfor-
mation in the context of other social sites where striking a subordinate 
was deemed acceptable. 
In contemporary popular understanding, the fact that our society no 
longer tolerates whippings—the most extreme form of corporal punish-
ment—is a difference thought to distinguish our more evolved, progres-
                                                                                                                       
1723 decrees that no person concerned in the correction shall undergo punishment for the same. By 
act of 1788 this was repealed.” MARY TREMAIN, SLAVERY IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, THE 
POLICY OF CONGRESS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ABOLITION 36 (New York, G. P. Putnam’s Sons 
1892). 
 10. Blackstone identified torts as 
battery; which is the unlawful beating of another. The least touching of another person 
wilfully, or in anger, is a battery; for the law cannot draw the line between different de-
grees of violence, and therefore totally prohibits the first and lowest stage of it: every 
man’s person being sacred, and no other having a right to meddle with it, in any the 
slightest manner. . . . But battery is, in some cases, justifiable or lawful; as where one 
who hath authority, a parent, or master, gives moderate correction to his child, his schol-
ar, or his apprentice. 
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *127. 
 11. Id. 
 12. “Relying on such hierarchical relationships to maintain social order in the absence of a 
standing police force, the legal system largely protected the meting out of brutal assault under the 
cloak of ‘discipline.’” Elizabeth B. Clark, “The Sacred Rights of the Weak”: Pain, Sympathy, and 
the Culture of Individual Rights in Antebellum America, 82 J. AM. HIST. 463, 464 (1995). 
 13. Chris Tomlins identifies “the presumption that a contract to deliver labor for money deliv-
ers the employee’s assent to serve; assent, that is, that for as long as the relationship continues the 
employer shall control and direct the disposition of the labor to be delivered” as the most obvious 
expression of legal asymmetry in the nineteenth-century employment relationship. CHRISTOPHER L. 
TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 226–27 (1993). I be-
lieve that Blackstone’s rule of corporal punishment, who may strike whom, is an even more obvious 
expression of legal asymmetry. 
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sive, and civilized present from our barbarous past.14 Rarely does one 
hear about a supervisor slapping an employee today, and when it occurs, 
the incident is sensationally publicized as barbaric and anomalous to our 
American values and tradition.15 Today there are boards of review for 
any funded experiment that may conceivably entail pain for human sub-
jects. Though we tend to believe that whipping was the sine qua non of 
slavery,16 in fact, striking workers was not restricted to slavery. Not only 
could workers and family members be beaten, they could be apprehend-
ed if they ran away.17 Running away in apprehension of beating or be-
cause of a beating is a common theme in many historical memoirs and 
legal documents.18 
So when and how did this barbaric practice cease to be legal in 
America? Who was the last legally beaten servant? And what, if any, 
legacy remains from such a past?  
Since we conventionally equate physical compulsion with slavery, 
we expect that workplace corporal punishment legally ended in 1865 
when slavery was abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.19 But that attribution simplifies and overdraws a 
much longer, more complex story of how corporal punishment was regu-
lated and how the broad generic authorization became restricted to cer-
                                                     
 14. Indeed one recent writer self-consciously describes his idea as “crazy” when he writes 
advocating the return of flogging as a substitute for prisons. PETER MOSKOS, IN DEFENSE OF 
FLOGGING, at vi (2011). 
 15. The two sensational incidents in the last twenty-five years were the caning of Michael Fay 
in Singapore for the crime of vandalism and Nike workers being beaten by their supervisors with the 
soles of shoes as they were sewing. After CBS reported that Nike workers had been slapped while at 
work, news media covered the issue from 1996 through 1998. See, e.g., 4,000 Workers Violently 
Protest at Nike Factory, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 27, 1997, at 16; Julia Angwin, The Tired Souls Behind 
Nike’s Soles; Indonesian Worker Tells of Suffering, S.F. CHRON., July 26, 1996, at B3; Associated 
Press, Nike Plants’ Workers are Abused, Says Labor Activist, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 1997, at 16; 
Verena Dobnik, Associated Press, Group Cites Abuses by Nike Subcontractors Inspection Finds Viet 
Women Being Fondled and Beaten, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 28, 1997, at E2; Nike Contractors Ac-
cused of Worker Abuse, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 29, 1997. 
 Fay’s beating was the result of his criminal conviction. The Nike workers beatings were acts of 
employee chastisement by their employers. Both incidents drew public outcry and extensive media 
coverage. For a discussion of Fay’s caning, see Scott Bloom, Spare The Rod, Spoil The Child? A 
Legal Framework For Recent Corporal Punishment Proposals, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 361, 
361–62 (1995). 
 16. “For good reason, the master’s whip has long served as a ubiquitous symbol of slavery 
everywhere.” JAMES OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE OLD SOUTH 4, 
6 (1990). Being auctioned from one master, or employer, to another is a practice that similarly is 
seen as an indicia of slavery. 
 17. In the words of one treatise writer, “He must enter into his master’s service and continue in 
it, and should he fail to do so, at common law, he may be compelled to return, or may be imprisoned 
till he becomes tractable.” WOOD, RELATION, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES, supra note 8, at 82. 
 18. See e.g., BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 19–20 
(First Avenue Editions 2016) (Charles W. Eliot ed., 1909). 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
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tain assailants and certain limited classes of servants before its eventual 
demise. For most American workers, vulnerability to corporal punish-
ment ended decades before the Civil War. Consequently, in overdrawing 
the connection between the end of corporal punishment and the end of 
slavery, a lesson is lost. 
By taking the longer view, beginning in 1800, one gains a more nu-
anced insight into how progressive social change occurs.20 By taking the 
broader view of comparing the legitimacy of workplace corporal pun-
ishment to its legitimacy in other settings, one can observe—sometimes 
by consonance, sometimes by contrast—arguments that differentiate or 
supplement its legitimacy. 
Further, by situating this disciplinary method in a range of social 
sites, one complicates the American progress meta-narrative as well. Did 
workplace beatings end because American society as a whole became 
more civilized and humane? Did the disappearance of this prerogative of 
authority actually render workers and masters more equal? Did masters 
actually lose ground and workers gain ground as the practice eroded? Or 
was the prerogative that masters once enjoyed simply recast in different 
terms, terms that did not necessarily equalize the disparity of status. Fi-
nally, by this examination, a difficult truth is revealed. The evidence re-
vealed here suggests that masters’ prerogatives of dominion may simply 
have assumed different forms without making the relationship more egal-
itarian. 
The sequence seems to be as follows. Workplace corporal punish-
ment was initially the undisputed province of masters. But thereafter in 
certain jurisdictions, it was regulated, and simultaneously legitimated, by 
statutes and ordinances that placed conditions upon the masters’ authori-
ty to impose discipline. Regulations protected some workers, notably 
indentured servants and apprentices, from excessive abuse by regulating 
the reasons that justified workplace corporal punishment and the propor-
tionality of the punishment. But as workplace corporal punishment erod-
ed, so too did state regulations of employer overreaching. It was that 
most extreme form of corporal punishment, whipping, that presented the 
most obvious subject of regulation. When that practice vanished, the 
state ceased its regulation of the master’s decision to discipline subordi-
nates and the gravity and proportionality of the punishment. The state 
never resumed focus on the injustices of other forms of workplace pun-
ishment such as undue coercion. Beating servants was the states’ regula-
tory anchor—it was where state regulation got its grip—and when whip-
                                                     
 20. I selected the year 1800 quite arbitrarily because it was after nationhood, though soon 
enough after U.S. independence that many colonial statutes on the subject of master and servant 
were still in force. 
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ping servants fell out of favor, there ceased to be any review of a mas-
ter’s unjust exercise of authority. 
Thereafter, doctrines of contract obscured the continuing conditions 
of unequal status21 and subsequently, contract doctrines gave rise to lais-
sez-faire attitudes that allowed masters virtually free reign over their 
servants to do whatever they wanted so long as they didn’t strike them. 
In the transition, masters regained their position of unfettered power over 
servants, albeit with different methods of exercising that power. By 
availing themselves of nonphysical methods, like keeping employees in 
precarious legal statuses and being able to summarily expel them from 
the source of their livelihood, masters could coercively abuse their serv-
ants without being held accountable. 
Striking subordinates always existed along a continuum. Society 
clung to these demographic categories and these categories were used in 
comparison in determining the proportionality of the blows. The rule of 
thumb—that a wife could not be struck with any stick larger than the size 
of a man’s thumb—is the most well-known of these guidelines.22 Less 
well-known rules maintained that though slaves could be whipped by a 
variety of instruments, they could not be pistol-whipped in circumstances 
where Native Americans could be.23 
Society clung to these demographic categories as well when differ-
ent subordinate groups sought relative improvements in their status as 
compared to others. Thus, rather than uniting the victims of this oppres-
sion, the very differentiation of status allowed one group to play itself off 
and be played off against another. Similar practices deployed against 
servants and wives left open the criticism that male servants were effem-
                                                     
 21. Chris Tomlins and Robert Steinfeld had described the rise of contractualization in the nine-
teenth century. See, e.g., TOMLINS, supra note 13, at 227. In the twentieth century, the principle of 
liberty of contract ascended significantly enough to preclude state regulation of employer abuse. See, 
e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also Jedediah Purdy, People as Resources: Recruitment and 
Reciprocity in the Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property, 56 DUKE L.J. 1047, 1078 (2007). The 
North Carolina Supreme Court reasoned that coercion of an employee, while “harsh,” is a conse-
quence of the “reciprocal rights of free labor relations” and that “any free employee stood . . . ‘upon 
an equality’ with his employer.” Purdy, supra, at 1078 (citing State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 
(1829)). 
 22. Beirne Stedman, Right of Husband to Chastise Wife, 3 VA. L. REG. N.S. 241, 241 (1917). 
 23. See State v. Wilson, 25 S.C.L. (Chev.) 163 (1840). In Wilson, the court states, 
The Act . . . designates the horse-whip, cow-skin, switch, or small stick, as instruments 
proper to be used for the correction of slaves. To [so] strike, therefore, with a pis-
tol, . . . constituted such a beating as . . . was punishable by indictment. 
Id. at 164–65. The assailant himself recognized the limitations of certain types of instruments for 
certain types of peoples as he pled that the reason he felt privileged to whip the person with a pistol 
was because he thought the man was an Indian—in which case he thought pistol-whipping was an 
appropriate instrumentality. Id. at 164. 
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inated by comparisons to wives.24 Servants were thought to be juve-
nalized in the case of comparison to children.25 Since slaves occupied the 
lowest status of all, both socially and legally,26 comparisons of similar 
treatment between servants and slaves was often argued to “demean” the 
servant most of all. (It was at this time that the very use of the term 
“servant” began to be supplanted by its French substitute, “employé.”27) 
Unfortunately, claims in some reform moments—that the mobilizing 
group not be treated like slaves—simply reinforced the diminished status 
of slaves by tacitly acknowledging that slaves could be subject to such 
treatment. 
Of course, in the social construction of the master’s authority, cor-
poral punishment was simply one method of punishment; there were oth-
er methods also. Some involved self-help; some involved the state. Using 
self-help, a master could deprive the servant of his liberty by various 
means: locking him in, docking his pay, limiting his food or drink, and 
recapturing him when he ran away.28 Each method of control had ad-
vantages for the master in different situations. Chastisement was espe-
                                                     
 24. See PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL (1998). In his 
chapter, “Not like Grandma Used to Bake,” Kens demonstrated that male bakers could be perceived 
as not needing, and hence, not deserving worker safety protection because they engaged in a process 
that had been done by women in the home previously. Id. at 6–14. 
 25. However, eventually this rationale could arguably only apply in situations where the home 
and market were considered to fall under the same sphere, as “only the head of a family could legal-
ly exercise control over and responsibility for the person of his dependents, whereas an employer 
could not exercise such control over his employees.” Atkinson, supra note 6, at 218. 
 26. Showcasing a facet of the master-servant relationship, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
“held that a renter of a slave had exactly the same power of labor discipline as a master” due to the 
fact that the “master’s power was not part of ‘domestic relations,’ . . . but a legally unique relation-
ship governed by the functional requirements of labor discipline.” Purdy, supra note 21, at 1065. 
 27. In fact, workers resisted being called “servants” because the word had come to be associat-
ed with enslavement. About the same time, the word “employee” came into parlance as a more ac-
ceptable substitute for the term, “servant.” The French term replaced “servant” in popular usage. 
Robert Steinfeld has documented that the very term “servant” became anathema as connoting hierar-
chy and dependence. Steinfeld reports the comment of the “help” of an American gentleman in the 
early nineteenth century that “none but negers are sarvants.” ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION 
OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 
1350–1870, at 127 (1991). 
 By 1874, treatise writer James Schouler addressed the other word, “master,” stating, “In these 
days we dislike to call any man master. . . . [I]t cannot be denied that master and servant is rather a 
repulsive title, and fast losing favor in this republican country. . . . ” JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS: EMBRACING HUSBAND AND WIFE, PARENT AND CHILD, 
GUARDIAN AND WARD, INFANCY, AND MASTER AND SERVANT 7 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 2d 
ed. 1874). 
 28. For example, there was an action for trespass called enticement wherein “the employee 
[was] treated as the property.” As the employee was treated as property, “the employer . . . had a 
right to exclude other ‘users’ of the employee’s labor.” Some states criminalized enticement. 
VanderVelde, supra note 2, at 491 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 941 (1866) (re-
marks of Sen. Trumbull) (quoting a Freedmen’s Bureau report from Houston, Texas)). 
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cially convenient because it was quick, direct, and relatively costless. Of 
course, all of these master prerogatives were antithetical to the concept of 
free labor.29 
The question of when a practice ceased to be legal is fraught with 
added complexity. It is almost impossible to get any real data on the 
prevalence of workplace corporal punishment, much less rulings on its 
legality. Christopher Tomlins has expertly demonstrated that there were 
multiple local practices and degrees of free and unfree labor in the early 
American republic.30 If practices could be pluralistic within a single ju-
risdiction, then the fact that the workplace was its own jurisdiction of 
authority rendered individual workplaces microclimes with their own 
rules and practices. Some masters may have resorted to beatings fre-
quently and some not at all. Moreover, how could the issue of legality be 
raised? Most likely, it would be if the servant sued for assault and bat-
tery.31 (Occasionally, the information surfaces obliquely when the fact of 
beating is noted in a case between other parties.32) But very few servants 
ever sued their masters for anything in the nineteenth century.33 The cir-
cumstances would have to be severe because servants rarely could avail 
themselves of lawyers to initiate a suit. Servants rarely litigated at all, let 
alone against their masters. 
We are left with only a handful of lawsuits—all of which involved 
severe whippings—to track the demise of Blackstone’s rule.34 Thus, this 
Article can only address the legal reasoning of the common law rather 
than that much vaster, more variegated, and virtually hidden realm of 
actual practices. Of course, there was considerable local variability in 
custom and regulation. Robert Steinfeld reminds us that local municipali-
ties could choose to regulate whipping or choose not to.35 
                                                     
 29. Robert Steinfeld writes: “The term ‘free’ labor is a shorthand way of expressing a compli-
cated societal judgment that employers should not be permitted to force laboring people to make 
certain difficult choices as they decide whether to perform their labor agreements.” ROBERT J. 
STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT, AND FREE LABOR IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 239 (2001). 
See generally VanderVelde, Labor Vision, supra note 2. 
 30. CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND: LAW, LABOR, AND CIVIC IDENTITY IN 
COLONIZING ENGLISH AMERICA, 1582–1865, at 296 (2010); see also TOMLINS, supra note 13, at 
261–68. 
 31. See Commonwealth v. Baird, 1 Ashmead 267 (1828); Matthews v. Terry, 10 Conn. 455 
(1835). These cases are discussed infra notes 165–173, 179, 182. 
 32. See Milburne v. Byrne, 17 F. Cas. 283 (C.C.D.C. 1805) (No. 9,542). 
 33. Except perhaps for wages, but the rules concerning wage claims were not at all straight-
forward. See generally Robert Gordon, Britton v. Turner: A Signpost on the Crooked Road to 
“Freedom” in the Employment Contract, in CONTRACT STORIES (Douglas G. Baird ed., 2007). 
 34. See Milburne, 17 F. Cas. at 283; Baird, 1 Ashmead at 267; Matthews, 10 Conn. at 455. 
 35. “A given polity might decide to establish criminal sanctions to punish contract breaches, 
but it might also decide not to. That choice, moreover, was only one of the numerous decisions that 
would into the construction of a labor practice.” STEINFELD, supra note 29, at 33. 
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Yet, a narrative emerges by examining the only data that we have 
about the legality of the assaultive practice: common law cases and legal 
treatises. The cases and treatises articulate assessments of the legitimacy 
of workplace corporal punishment and, from treatise to successive trea-
tise over the course of the century, the discourse shifts as the assessment 
changes. It appears that the prerogative of striking workers evolved in 
two stages. Originally, the master had virtually free reign to impose such 
punishment. The master ruled as prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner 
in meting out discipline, much as tribes and clans mete out punishment 
and discipline in stateless societies. With the advent of the more orga-
nized state, the law intervened occasionally to make these disciplinary 
punishments more rational in their application. These restrictions could 
take the form of direct regulation, when beatings went too far, or nui-
sance actions, when chastisement was done in public and disturbed the 
peace. In some municipalities, communities passed legislation restricting 
the master’s prerogative. Courts and legislatures imposed some limits on 
the extent to which a servant could be whipped and, at the same time, the 
reasons that justified such severe punishment.36 These legal restrictions 
sought to prevent wanton or vindictive beatings by masters. Thereafter, 
the second change occurred when physical chastisement ceased to be an 
acceptable workplace practice.37 Even cuffing with the hand could sub-
ject the assailant to tort liability.38 By the 1840s, masters no longer en-
joyed the perquisite of striking workers. The treatises narrowed the rules’ 
scope of application and finally rebuked Blackstone’s rule. Thus, in 
Hohfeldian terms,39 the rule completely reversed: what began as the mas-
ter’s privilege was re-assigned to the worker as a right of bodily integrity 
                                                     
 36. See Virginia and Maryland statutes discussed infra at text accompanying notes 128–131, 
139–143. 
 37. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 6, at 223–24 (citing Davis v. State, 6 Tex. App. 133, 139 
(1879)). 
 38. Treatise writer Horace G. Wood wrote: 
He must enter into his master’s service and continue in it, and should he fail to do so, at 
common law, he may be compelled to return, or may be imprisoned till he becomes trac-
table. He is bound to observe all the reasonable regulations established by the mas-
ter . . . and if he fails in this respect, the master may reprove, or even moderately chastise 
him, if a minor, but not if of full age. . . . The master has no right to chastise a servant for 
disobedience, negligence, or any cause except such as would justify him in assaulting a 
stranger. From the relation (except as to apprentices) no right is acquired to punish him 
by corporal punishment. If the servant’s conduct is such as to merit punishment, the mas-
ter’s only remedy is to discharge him, or bear his misconduct with patience and modera-
tion. 
WOOD, RELATION, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES, supra note 8, at 303–04. 
 39. See generally WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS, AS 
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING: AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (1919). There were still plenty of 
workplace dangers exposing workers to accidents and pain, but masters were generally absolved 
from liability for employees’ workplace accidents by the three common law defenses. 
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from intentionally inflicted pain, and masters engaging in such conduct 
were deemed to have committed an unlawful assault. 
Despite the centrality of whipping’s demise as a master narrative of 
Western progress, the discursive narrative within legal texts by which 
this reversal occurred has not been examined.40 Slight changes of direc-
tion of the law are often signaled in the words used in judicial opinions 
and treatises. What is said leaves open the unsaid. Moreover, it is worth 
examining these texts because the manner in which changes occur can 
influence the legitimacy of what follows. The fact that violence struc-
tured the work relationship may have left some social residual. A full 
account of the social norms at play is beyond the scope of this Article. 
This Article can only mark the stages of legal change articulated through 
legal documents. Legal discourse matters, and legal discourse is the sub-
ject of this Article.41 
There is no question that corporal punishment established masters’ 
dominance, but for a while the practice was subject to at least some ac-
countability. Now, Americans have a default employment law that al-
lows employers to discipline employees without accountability. Employ-
ers may discipline employees without reason or for reasons that are never 
subject to any review.42  
The nineteenth-century prerogative of chastisement shaped modern 
employment law in two ways. First, as workplace corporal punishment 
ceased to be socially acceptable and eroded, it left in its place a com-
mand and control discipline that was no longer regulated by the state for 
rationality or proportionality.43  Although workplace corporal punish-
                                                     
 40. One book brought together an analysis of campaigns against corporal punishment, but the 
subject of servant chastisement is not included. See generally MYRA C. GLENN, CAMPAIGNS 
AGAINST CORPORAL PUNISHMENT: PRISONERS, SAILORS, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN IN ANTEBELLUM 
AMERICA (1984). 
 41. Tomlins states: 
 The social and political antipathies of the populace were one thing, however; the 
professional discourse of law quite another. 
. . . Resort to the same nomenclature in the generality of cases involving employment is-
sues coming before the courts in the industrializing states during the first half of the nine-
teenth century testifies to the tendency of lawyers and the judiciary to construe the broad 
spectrum of employment relationships using a comprehensive common law discourse of 
master and servant . . . [and] legal discourse has social consequences. 
TOMLINS, supra note 13, at 224–25. 
 42. An employer can, potentially, threaten her employees “without that threat being legally 
recognized as coercive or without providing the employee with a remedy for unjust dismissal” as 
things like economic pressure (“absent specific statutory restrictions”) do not “fall within the legal 
definitions of ‘duress’ or ‘coercion.’” Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elec-
tions, and the First Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 407 (1995). 
 43. The history of corporal punishment in Russia seems to have followed a similar course, an 
attempt to rationalize and standardize before full abolition at a time of the creation of prisons in 
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ment is now an anomaly, modern employment law retains a similar dom-
inance structure to what existed when servants could be whipped by mas-
ters without the mediating influence of the state. In other words, even 
though that earlier practice no longer determines the workplace organiza-
tion, its vestigial imprint remains. What corporal punishment once sym-
bolized has simply been split into various modern components. The 
components that replaced physical compulsion include coercion, obedi-
ence, loyalty, and most of all, termination at the employers’ whim under 
the at-will doctrine. 
Most often, what the leather strap once symbolized in terms of in-
stilling fear by the threat of unilaterally inflicted punishment has been 
replaced with the “pink slip.”44 As whipping is a severe sanction, so too 
being fired from one’s job can be a very severe sanction. More than just 
corporal punishment, it is described as the “capital punishment” of em-
ployment relations.45 It is a penalty whose severity increases the longer 
that a worker remains with the same employer, over time tying his de-
pendence to the employer more tightly because of the worker’s diminish-
ing opportunities as he ages. And the operative law for most American 
workers is that they can be discharged under the at-will doctrine for no 
reason at all, or even for reasons of vindictiveness that are reprehensi-
ble.46 Although more modern idioms have replaced corporal punishment, 
the employment relation retains a well-recognized structure in which 
employers retain out-sized claims to prerogative, discipline, and loyalty. 
The relation is not really structured as a mutually beneficial agreement of 
equal contracting parties engaged in advancing the enterprise; given the 
default, it retains the stamp of master and servant status. 
This hints at a possible explanation of the practice’s erosion. Per-
haps, the privilege of beating servants eroded not because civilization 
and progress produced a more humane society, but because the practice 
was no longer suited to the needs for workplace organization and was no 
longer necessary to achieve a master’s prerogatives. A master’s com-
manding control can now be continually achieved by the coercion of be-
ing under the perennial threat of discharge. Coercion has replaced com-
pulsion as the control mechanism and, by operating under the radar of 
                                                                                                                       
Siberia. See generally ABBY M. SCHRADER, LANGUAGES OF THE LASH: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 
AND IDENTITY IN IMPERIAL RUSSIA (2002). 
 44. See Story, supra note 42, at 408 n.270. “Courts still hold that the threat of termination is 
not coercive.” Id. 
 45. See, e.g., David E. Feller, Arbitration: Its Glory Days Are Numbered, 2 BERKELEY J. EMP. 
& LAB. L. 97, 104 (1977). 
 46. See, e.g., Bammert v. Don’s Super Valu, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 365 (Wis. 2002) (declaring that 
it was reprehensible that an employer would fire an employee because her husband, a state trooper, 
had charged the employer’s wife with drunk driving). 
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review for possible injustice, coercion gives employers the broadest au-
thority to impose discipline. Coercive practices, which are nonphysical, 
are less susceptible to observation and quantification, and hence, less 
susceptible to regulation and review by the state. 
Second, the emergence of workers’ protection against corporal pun-
ishment never evolved into a more fulsome security of personal dignity, 
autonomy, and privacy in the workplace as a consequence of the rever-
sal. Although the practice of assaulting workers eroded, it did so uncou-
pled from a social movement to articulate and create an affirmative and 
robust concept of worker dignity, privacy, and partnership in its place. 
Hence, twenty-first century American courts have trouble identifying a 
legal source for employee claims of dignity, personal autonomy, and pri-
vacy.47 Although free labor requires all three aspects to ensure that work-
ers are not coerced unfairly, these aspects of workers’ freedom have yet 
to fully blossom and bear fruit in the American nation. In this particular 
change of law and convention, there was no broader germinal reform 
idea from which a more solidly rooted notion of a worker’s right to dig-
nity could sprout. Although now an employer can no more strike his em-
ployee than he can a stranger,48 strangers still retain much greater protec-
tions against intrusions upon their privacy and assaults upon their dignity 
than do workers from their employers. 
A sustained examination of how the at-will doctrine arose is beyond 
the scope of this Article; this Article can only tell the story of the decline 
of workplace corporal punishment and hint at its replacement. 
I. PRIVATE RELATIONSHIPS AND CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 
Consider three parallel settings where persons in authority once 
held the prerogative of imposing corporal punishment on their subordi-
nates: 1) the family—the propriety of a master to strike his wife and his 
children; 2) the penal systems—the propriety of the state to whip crimi-
nals as punishment for crime;49 and 3) the military—the propriety of an 
                                                     
 47. See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985). In this case, 
the Arizona Supreme court flailed around to find a basis on which a woman could sue when she 
alleged she was fired because she refused to pull down her pants in a skit with other employees. Id. 
There are only a handful of states that have a right of privacy in their state constitutions that can 
serve as a basis for an employee’s claim that an invasion of privacy is a matter of public policy. The 
Restatement of Employment Law attempted to remonstrate against this deficiency, but other than 
states that have privacy rights enumerated in their constitutions, there are few cases where an em-
ployee’s privacy rights are recognized. See generally MATTHEW FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT 
LAW (3d ed. 2009). 
 48. WOOD, RELATION, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES, supra note 8, at 303–04 (explaining “[t]he 
master has no right to chastise a servant for disobedience, negligence, or any cause except such as 
would justify him in assaulting a stranger”). 
 49. See discussion infra notes 52, 65, 91, 101. 
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officer to strike his subordinates for insolence.50 This comparison is use-
ful because societies acculturated to corporal punishment in other set-
tings are more likely to tolerate corporal punishment in the workplace. 
Social tolerance of beating one’s wife or child reinforced acceptance of 
the notion that servants similarly could be struck.51 After all, if a person 
as weak or defenseless as a wife or child could suffer beatings, why 
would one believe that it would be too much for an adult worker to en-
dure? Reversing the argument, if corporal punishment toughens soldiers 
to discipline in the army, shouldn’t it function to similarly desirable ends 
when men are asked to perform difficult work? 
One is tempted to think that common law had little role to play in 
the organization of private employment but, in fact, it is exactly the pri-
vate-public distinction that authorized masters to enjoy the privilege of 
corporal punishment in organizing their private domains. Under the 
common law, the workplace domain remained its own juridical sphere.52 
By refusing to come to the aid of the weaker party in these private dis-
putes, the state was essentially complicit in this practice.  
Moreover, the carryover from one status category to another was 
strengthened because the common law structured these relationships as 
parallel. Blackstone organized his catalogue of the great relations of pri-
vate life as a set of parallel chapters, beginning with the master and serv-
ant (the longest, most detailed chapter)53 and following it with husband 
and wife and parent and child as basically devolutions of master and 
servant. Within the “great relations of private life,” as Blackstone called 
them,54 the world was divided up into many mini-sovereign households 
in which the master’s discipline provided the core unit of societal disci-
                                                     
 50. See discussion infra notes 162, 247, 253, 256. 
 51. According to Blackstone’s section on “Correction of the Wife,” 
Under the old law, the husband might give his wife moderate correction. For as he is to 
answer for her misbehavior, the law intrusted him with the power of restraining her by 
domestic chastisement, as he would punish a child or an apprentice. But this power of 
correction was confined within reasonable bounds, and he was prohibited from using vio-
lence. The civil law gave a man even a larger authority over his wife, permitting him to 
whip her, if he deemed it necessary. This form of correction was checked in the reign of 
Charles II, and has not been revived, but the courts of law still permit a husband to re-
strain his wife of her liberty, in case of any gross misbehavior. 
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *147. 
 52. See Atkinson, supra note 6, at 210–11 (noting that local officials also “enforced good 
household government by policing household heads to make sure they exercised sufficient control 
over profligate dependents). 
 53. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *136–475. 
 54. Id. 
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pline and responsibility.55 The state stayed out of the way so that the 
master could assume the role of controlling (governing) his dependents. 
Obviously, the quality of privacy accorded the private domains of 
workplaces and family life differ. Feminist scholars have explored do-
mestic relations quite thoroughly, detailing how the intimacy that fami-
lies are accorded provided an obstacle to state-intervention to protect the 
victim in domestic abuse. Most often, the distinction drawn between pub-
lic and private in feminist jurisprudence, for example, has been viewed 
as an insulating factor—insulating intra-household violence from public 
scrutiny and intervention.56 According to Blackstone, the husband was 
authorized to “correct” his wife because he could be held responsible for 
her actions;57 but, in fact, outsiders rarely intervened because given cov-
erture, no one was thought to have the authority to interfere with these 
acts.58 Acts of private violence within the nuclear family, for example, 
even if brutal, were customarily regarded as “none of the public’s busi-
ness” and private in the nature of “intimacy,” and hence, beyond the 
scope of state regulation. The intimate relation was itself curtained off 
within the private sphere.59 Strangers would not dare to interfere with the 
manner in which a husband governed his wife or raised his children,60 
and hence, his decision to strike them was regarded as beyond interfer-
ence. 
The workplace, however, was never as permanently curtained off 
and tightly sealed as was the family. First, blood ties and marriage bonds 
were permanent. One could disown a wife if she ran away, but it was 
impossible in many states to divorce. By comparison, in the work rela-
tion, one could rid oneself of a servant or sell a slave to someone else. 
                                                     
 55. Similarly, in describing the public utility of this ideal type, political philosopher William 
Paley wrote that it achieved “the better government of society, by distributing the community into 
separate families; and appointing over each, the authority of a master of a family, which has more 
actual influence, than all civil authority put together.” WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL 
AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 241–42 (Boston, West and Richardson 1785). 
 56. Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE 
L.J. 2117, 2206–07 (1996). 
 57. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *421–33. 
 58. “In short, a view of marriage as a sacred ordinance and a basis for ‘respectability’ blunted 
public discussion of marital violence. The allegedly private nature of the domestic, especially mari-
tal, bond also hindered widespread public discussion of wife beating.” GLENN, supra note 40, at 80; 
see also Elizabeth Pleck, Wife Beating in Nineteenth-Century America, 4 VICTIMOLOGY 60, 61 
(1979). See generally Siegel, supra note 56. 
 59. Siegel, supra note 56, at 2178–87. 
 60. Cook v. Cook, 124 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939). Cook, a foster child, sued his foster 
parent, accusing him of “malicious and unprovoked” assault. Id. at 675. The court ruled in favor of 
the foster parent, citing Mannion v. Mannion, 129 A. 431 (N.J. Cir. Ct. 1925), “that a minor child 
cannot sue one of his parents, at least during minority, for the negligent act of such parent from 
which that child suffers injury to his person.” Id. at 677. The court went on to note that this finding 
was “based upon the interest that society has in preserving harmony in the domestic relations.” Id. 
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The master could unfasten the bond he had with servants by assigning 
them to someone else. 
Second, patterns of cases suggest that outsiders occasionally inter-
fered in work relations if they saw something awry. There are recorded 
instances where third parties interfered when servants, or even slaves, 
were severely beaten, particularly when the beating took place in public 
view. This kind of third-party intervention may have been occasioned in 
the same manner that led a stranger to implore a man ruthlessly beating a 
horse on the street to stop.61 Third parties showed less inhibition from 
interceding to protect a horse, a slave, or a servant as a sentient being, 
than they did to protect a man’s wife or child from him. However, alt-
hough third parties sometimes interceded, they rarely questioned the 
master’s right to raise his hand against the servant. 
To be sure, the interventions by third parties may simply have de-
pended upon the situs where the beating took place. Beating someone in 
the street could become a common law nuisance if it interfered with 
passersby. Some jurisdictions held that beating a worker in public view 
was a common law nuisance to be restricted accordingly.62 The prudent 
master was advised to “take it inside,” so to speak. Still further, outsider 
interference with the master who chose to whip his servant sometimes 
backfired into even more prolonged disputes between the master and the 
intermeddler.63 These common law cases are based upon the stranger’s 
                                                     
 61. NADINE GORDIMER, BURGER’S DAUGHTER 209–10 (1979) (detailing the emergence of a 
sense of social consciousness in the protagonist through witnessing a donkey being brutally 
whipped); see also United States v. Jackson, 26 F. Cas. 555, 555 (C.C.D.C. 1834) (No. 15,453) 
(holding that public cruelty of beating a cow to its death near a public street in Washington is an 
indictable offence at common law, as a public nuisance). The defendant moved to quash the indict-
ment arguing that under The Maryland Act of 1809, c. 138, § 4, cruelty to brutes was not punishable 
at common law. Id.; see also United States v. Logan, 26 F. Cas. 990, 990 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 
15,263) (holding that public cruelty to a horse is an indictable offence). The indictment was for 
cruelty to a horse in a public street in Washington; the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to 
both a fine and 20 days’ imprisonment. Id. 
 62. The Virginia cases are founded upon the peculiar qualities of slavery. See, e.g., United 
States v. Brockett, 24 F. Cas. 1241 (C.C.D.C. 1823) (No. 14,651). To cruelly, inhumanly, and mali-
ciously cut, slash, beat, and ill treat one’s own slave, is an indictable offence at common law. Id. at 
1242. Defendant’s attorney contended that “if the whipping be private, there is no limit, so that it 
does not extend to voluntary killing or mutilation. But in order to prevent the necessity of the court’s 
giving any instruction on this point, he admitted that if the jury should be of opinion that the offence 
justified the language of the indictment, it is an indictable offence.” Id. The jury found the following 
verdict: “We of the jury find the traverser not guilty of the counts as stated in the indictment, but 
recommend that the Court should express their strong disapprobation of similar conduct.” Id. 
 63. Disputes between the person attempting to have the subject laborer whipped and some 
person who seeking to halt the beating form a distinct subcategory of cases involving the law of the 
whip. These cases defy a binary categorization as purely private or purely-public. 
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trespass upon the master’s authority.64 These disputes then required some 
public involvement to examine the limits of the master’s authorization. 
In addition, some localities regulated workplace punishment direct-
ly. State intervention limited the number and force of the blows, the part 
of the body that could be struck, and the weapon that could be used.65 
More severe beatings were justified by more severe infractions.66 Correl-
atively, beating was unjustified when there was no insolence or infrac-
tion at all. Such a master was simply ruthless and cruel in exercising his 
dominion over others without justification for the mere sport or mean-
ness of it.67 
II. BEATINGS’ PURPOSES 
The fundamental purpose of corporal punishment is to inflict pain 
with the intent to influence the victim’s behavior. This is the “stick” part 
of the carrot and the stick. One thinks of whipping as a method to induce 
people to work harder.68 But, striking a subordinate had additional pur-
poses consistent with maintaining the master’s authority. 
                                                     
 64. See cases cited infra notes 203–07. 
 65. See discussion of Milburne v. Byrne infra Part II.B.2; see also Maxine D. Goodman, Hu-
man Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740 (2006). 
 Under Jewish Biblical law, punishment can be no more severe than is necessary to achieve the 
punitive purpose without unnecessarily humiliating the offender. Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. 
Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy and the Four Biblical Methods of Capital Punishment: Stoning, Burn-
ing, Beheading, and Strangulation, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1169, 1204 (2004). Regarding flogging, the 
Torah mandates strict limits on the number of lashes: 
[I]f the guilty one is to be flogged, the magistrate shall have him lie down and be given 
lashes in his presence, by count, as his guilt warrants. He may be given up to forty lashes, 
but not more, lest being flogged further, to excess, your brother be degraded before your 
eyes. 
Deuteronomy 25:2–3. Talmudic law limits the number to thirty-nine to avoid exceeding forty by 
accident. The commentary states that because the flogging itself is degrading, the concern must be 
that excessive flogging would lead to something even more degrading. ETZ HAYIM, TORAH AND 
COMMENTARY 1132 (David L. Lieber ed., Rabbinical Assembly, 2001). I thank Matt Finkin for this 
insight. 
 66. This was seen most clearly in criminal codes that varied the number of lashes based upon 
the severity of the crime. 
 67. In Richard Dana’s memoir, he recounts witnessing a whipping in which his master called 
out, “If you want to know what I flog you for, I’ll tell you. It’s because I like to do it!—because I 
like to do it! It suits me!—That’s what I do it for!” CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, RICHARD HENRY 
DANA: A BIOGRAPHY 104–06 (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin and Co. 1890) (reproducing the written 
memoirs of Richard Henry Dana). 
 68. GEORGE RYLEY SCOTT, THE HISTORY OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT: A SURVEY OF 
FLAGELLATION IN ITS HISTORICAL, ANTHROPOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS 71 (1838). “In 
all parts of the world and all through the ages wherever and whenever slavery has existed, the whip 
has been the favourite method of securing from these forced labourers the utmost possible amount of 
work.” Id. 
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First, whipping served as a means of displaying and establishing hi-
erarchical dominance.69 As Dan Kahan writes: “Corporal punishment 
was . . . perceived to be distinctive of hierarchical relationships; the in-
fliction of acute physical pain was the way that sovereigns disciplined 
their subjects, husbands their wives, parents their children, and masters 
their servants or slaves.”70 The dominance function is well-illustrated by 
the fact that this practice was never reciprocal. Servants could not take 
up a stick against a master or slap him without grave penalty.71 
Second, when this kind of punishment was done publicly, it carried 
the additional and sometimes more important meaning of shaming the 
subordinate rather than simply injuring him. 
Third, these displays of dominance can be directed at maintaining 
class or caste hierarchy as well as interpersonal hierarchy.72 Interpersonal 
hierarchy is at stake when men contest each other’s prowess using the 
taunt of whipping the other’s pudendum. Even members of subordinated 
social groups like sailors, young boys, and enslaved men used the meta-
phor as a taunt. Fistfights were bragged about in the terms, “I whipped 
him” or “I gave him a licking.” In these instances, “whipping” was com-
pletely unrelated to achieving work. These displays of dominance were 
not necessarily class or race-based. Parties to the contest could be near 
equals of the same race.73 In these instances, whipping was simply a 
means by which men attempted to best each other. The person who 
struck another displayed his dominance over the person struck. Domi-
nance could be demonstrated even if no blows were struck, if one party 
turned and ran at the prospect of a beating. 
But, in a fourth category, the practice could be used to reinforce 
class and racial distinctions. Cases from the American south demonstrate 
that over time the class of persons who were legally permitted to exercise 
the prerogative expanded to such a degree that some persons could strike 
slaves even when they were not the slave master and his overseer. Mem-
                                                     
 69. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 611–12 
(1996). 
 70. Id. at 612. 
 71. Blackstone wrote: “A master may by law correct his apprentice or servant for negligence or 
other misbehavior . . . . But if any servant, workman, or labourer assaults his master or dame, he 
shall suffer one year’s imprisonment, and other open corporal punishment, not extending to life or 
limb.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *416. 
 Even in the eastern code of Manu, much more severe penalties attach when a lower order indi-
vidual transgressed upon his superior than when the transgression was top-down. THE LAWS OF 
MANU 301 (Georg Bühler trans., 1886). 
 72. Kahan, supra note 69, at 612. 
 73. Cranch reports that two members of the House of Representatives, William Stanbury and 
Cave Johnson, threatened to whip the other to settle the dispute between them. United States v. Hou-
ston, 26 F. Cas. 261 (C.C.D.C. 1832) (No. 15,347). 
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bers of patrols and even strangers from the public at large were allowed 
to exercise the prerogative. As workplace corporal punishment eroded in 
the north, it became increasingly associated with enslavement until it 
reached a point that whipping in particular was reserved almost exclu-
sively to the treatment of slaves.74 
Concomitantly, enslavement became the last remaining category of 
bound labor in the United States at the same time that it was increasingly 
racialized by being limited to African-Americans. During the early re-
public, bound apprenticeship died out.75 Courts declared that Native 
Americans could no longer be enslaved.76 And once the native born pop-
ulation grew to fulfill the nation’s need for potential workers, the practice 
of bringing redemptioners from Europe became less profitable, virtually 
ending that practice of bound labor.77 Enslavement came to be the exclu-
sive category of bound labor at the same time that slavery, as a legal sta-
tus, became completely racialized.78 
And as corporal punishment, and particularly the use of the whip, 
became increasing racialized, it was transformed from the master’s per-
sonal prerogative to the group prerogative of the entire class of masters 
(almost exclusively white) over slaves (now exclusively black).79 A mas-
ter whipped a slave to get work done or to maintain his personal authori-
ty, but other members of society might do so solely for purposes of racial 
and class subjugation. As a prerogative of dominance, whipping became 
a prerogative shared by the slave’s master (or mistress) with other mem-
bers of the dominant class, such as neighbors, strangers, and patrols.80 
                                                     
 74. Kahan, supra note 69, at 613–14 (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 74 (1993); HERBERT ARNOLD FALK, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT: 
A SOCIAL INTERPRETATION OF ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE SCHOOLS OF THE UNITED STATES 
14–15 (1941)). 
 75. W.J. RORABAUGH, THE CRAFT APPRENTICE: FROM FRANKLIN TO THE MACHINE AGE 209 
(1988). 
 76. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 420 (1857); see also Marguerite v. Chouteau, 3 
Mo. 540, 541, 571–72 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1834), discussed in LEA VANDERVELDE, REDEMPTION SONGS: 
SUING FOR FREEDOM BEFORE DRED SCOTT (2014). 
 77. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Struggle Over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and 
Articles of Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743, 783 (1996). See also STEINFELD, supra note 27, at 164 
for a discussion of how the practice of bringing redemptioners ended. 
 78. Bilder, supra note 77, at 808–09 (pointing out that by 1843, the debate over possession of 
persons had been limited to black slaves). 
 79. See Reuel E. Schiller, Conflicting Obligations: Slave Law and the Late Antebellum North 
Carolina Supreme Court, 78 VA. L. REV. 1207, 1223 (1992) (stating that state laws allowed non-
slave owners to discipline unruly slaves) (citing State v. Jowers, 33 N.C. (11 Ired.) 555 (1850); State 
v. Tackett, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 210, 216 (1820) (explaining that “turbulence and insolence” from a 
slave could constitute adequate provocation for his murder by a white man). 
 80. See, e.g., infra text accompany note 213; see also infra note 209. I generalize here, based 
on my reading of the Caterall cases, but I believe that this is a topic that merits closer study. 
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Thus, the larger narrative reveals that in the nineteenth century, as 
the master’s right of chastisement was slowly stripped from higher-order 
labor statuses, one-by-one, it remained the norm for the slave status and 
its usage expanded. As each line of differentiation was made, at each 
stage of removal from higher-order labor statuses, it appears that there 
was an accompanying entrenchment of beatings for lower-order labor 
statuses, such as slaves and sailors.81 
In public and private terms then, all three functions of corporal pun-
ishment—(1) disciplining a servant to workplace norms, (2) whipping to 
best or shame another, and (3) whipping to secure racial subjugation—
shared two attributes. The corporal punishment had to be [A] a public, or 
semi-public display and [B] it was subject to a certain political economy. 
The blows had to be semi-public: what good was besting another if there 
was no one to witness one’s dominance? Spreading one’s reputation of 
besting required there be witnesses. To be effective, whipping had to 
serve as a general deterrent as well as a specific deterrent. That is, it had 
to be known or observed by others in the subordinated group.82 Even if 
the master personally distanced himself from the beating by ordering the 
overseer to whip the slave at some cloistered place, and even if the per-
petrators of violence covered their faces and identities with masks or 
hoods, the fact of whipping had to be known to chill other subordinates 
from challenging that authority.83 The violent effects of whipping had to 
be on display if it was to be effective in attaining its objective of subjuga-
tion. Accordingly, when disciplining to labor was the beating’s primary 
purpose, the intended audience consisted of others in the same work-
place. 
                                                     
 81. See JOEL P. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 534 (7th ed. 1882). In Eng-
land, “the master has right of chastisement.” Id. In the United States, “only to the masters of appren-
tices and other minors to whom they stand in loco parentis.” Id. “In these cases the right does exist; 
yet most fully, though perhaps not exclusively, where the minor is domesticated in the household.” 
Id. “The relations of master and apprentices is for the instruction of the child, and there may be an 
analogy between it and the teacher and pupil.” Id. “But one who has simply hired a minor from the 
father is not, therefore, put in loco parentis, with the right of chastisement, where no parental consent 
thereto has been given . . . [a] master who beats his apprentice immoderately is indictable for bat-
tery.” Id. This was true even in the articulation of the meanings of “involuntary servitude” in the 
congressional debates on the Thirteenth Amendment. VanderVelde, Labor Vision, supra note 2, at 
454–59. 
 82. Kahan, supra note 69, at 611 (“Shame was an even more salient ingredient of corporal 
punishment than physical pain.”). 
 83. In these instances, the master might prefer to do the whipping himself taking care to avoid 
scarring the servant’s flesh. Scars revealed the servant’s insubordinate nature and consequently 
lowered his sale price. “Brown said that he would Whip the negro himself, but he did not wish the 
law to whip him—that he did not want him cut up, as he intended to sell him.” Hudson v. Brown, 45 
S.C.L. (11 Rich.) 643, 644 (1858). But these private circumstances also had a semi-public dimen-
sion, even though more covert, since the public visibility of the slave’s skin would reflect on the 
slave’s docility and his or her value in the public light of the marketplace. 
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Moreover, in terms of political economy, corporal punishment had 
to be utilized somewhat sparingly. Such discipline could never be visited 
on every subordinate; nor could the practice be resorted to daily. It was 
fear that spread the effect from the victim to others. Racial subjugation, 
similarly, could not be visited on every member of the subjugated class. 
Invoking the punitive practices was best done in circumstances where the 
punishment was severe enough that that servant and other servants would 
comply quickly and regularly with the master’s commands in order to 
avoid experiencing it again. 
In summary, although the practice began as a right that the master 
could exercise over all in his household, it assumed its distinctly race- 
and status-based connotations in America by the 1830s and 1840s, which 
manifested in two ways. First, racial subjugation sustained the practice in 
the antebellum South long after the practice lost respectability in the 
North.84 As such, it was seen as a means of disciplining an entire race of 
human beings that was perceived as inferior. Second, corporal punish-
ment also was sustained because the slave was deemed chattel with 
whom the master could do much as he pleased.85 Yet, the close associa-
tion of whipping with slavery was the merely the last act, the end-game 
of two phenomena: the demise of corporal punishment in the higher-
order statuses and the last institution of bound labor: racialized enslave-
ment.86 
                                                     
 84. See Schiller, supra note 79, at 1210–11 (describing how violent class subjugation of slaves 
was permitted to help maintain control of the growing slave class). Lisa Cardyn, who has systemati-
cally documented violence against African-Americans in Reconstruction and thereafter, devotes an 
entire section to the practice of “whipping.” Lisa Cardyn, Sexualized Racism/Gendered Violence: 
Outraging the Body Politic in the Reconstruction South, 100 MICH. L. REV. 675, 704–16 (2002). 
 85. See State v. Maner, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 453, 454 (1834) (“The criminal offense of assault 
and battery cannot at common law be committed on the person of a slave.”). But see United States v. 
Butler, 25 F. Cas. 212 (C.C.D.C. 1806) (No. 14,697). The report reads: 
 Assault and battery of a slave is an indictable offence.  
 Indictment for beating a woman of color (a slave) to her damage, and against the 
peace and dignity of the government of the U.S.  
 Mr. Hamilton, for the traverser, contended that beating a slave was not an indictable 
offence.  
 CURIA. contra. The property which a man has in a slave is not of the same nature 
as his property in a horse. It is a right to his perpetual service. 
Id. 
 Yet, early on masters had property rights in all who owed them service. Certainly throughout 
this period, a husband could treat a wife as he pleased. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *421–34 (stating that by the old law a husband could chastise his wife as long as it 
was not unreasonably so). 
 86. Similarly, after the final curtain, after slavery was abolished, enslavement as so strongly 
identified with chattelization may have been a distinguishing rationale employed to a greater extent 
after slavery’s abolition to limit the extent of the antislavery reforms than as an explanatory rationale 
when slavery was legal. 
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The stick, the strap, and the whip represented a different, more pur-
poseful form of violence: that of violent compulsion. Corporal punish-
ment represented directed violence, in which its ferocity was not only 
intentional but also subject to measurement in at least two ways: one, by 
counting the number of stripes laid on the person, and two, by limiting 
the instrumentalities of force.87 Its susceptibility to measurement ren-
dered it susceptible to regulation. At the time, such regulation was 
thought to civilize the use of intentional violence.88  
A. Hypotheses: Whipping as the Litmus Test in Four Progress Narratives 
It is difficult to appreciate just how prevalent bound labor was in 
American history because we believe that our refusal to endorse corporal 
punishment defined our claim to “western-ness.” Certainly, corporal pun-
ishment is widely endorsed in the Code of Manu, the ancient Hindu law 
text.89 By comparison, Joseph Conrad wrote, “[i]t would never occur [to 
a citizen of the West] that he could be beaten with whips as a practical 
measure . . . .”90 The Western eyes of which Joseph Conrad writes never 
focused on the American legacy of workplace corporal punishment. 
                                                     
 87. State v. Robbins, 48 N.C. (3 Jones) 249, 255–56 (1855). Where a master was indicted for 
murdering his slave, the court found the master guilty of murder and refused to allow the homicide 
to be mitigated to manslaughter, stating: “The prisoner [master] then had a right to chastise the de-
ceased for the only offense of which there is the slightest testimony that he was guilty. . . . Punish-
ment, thus immoderate and unreasonable in the measure, the continuance, and the instruments, loses 
all character of correction in foro domestico, and denotes plainly, that the prisoner [master] must 
have contemplated the fatal termination which was the natural consequence of such barbarous cruel-
ties.” Id. See also State v. Wilson, 25 S.C.L. (Chev.) 163 (1840). The assailant himself recognized 
the limitations of certain types of instruments for certain types of peoples as he pled that the reason 
he felt privileged to whip the person with a pistol was because he thought the slave was an Indian—
in which case he thought pistol-whipping was the appropriate instrumentality. Id. at 164. 
 88. In a case submitted to Judge Cranch by the U.S. Attorney General and the U.S. Marshall to 
answer questions regarding fees to be collected for the custody of runaways, the court discussed the 
statutes of Maryland. Maryland had a statute that “provides for the humane treatment of servants by 
their masters, and limits their correction to ten lashes, unless by order of a magistrate, who cannot 
order more than thirty-nine.” In re Runaways & Petitioners for Freedom, 21 F. Cas. 1 (C.C.D.C. 
1834) (No. 12,137); see also Schiller, supra note 79, at 1212 (describing how regulation of slave 
punishment became the norm). 
 89. See generally THE LAWS OF MANU, supra note 71. Brahmans were not supposed to exer-
cise corporal punishment. Id. at ch. 4, § 164. “Let him, when angry, not raise a stick against another 
man, nor strike (anybody) except a son or a pupil; those two he may beat in order to correct them.” 
Id. The exception, here too, was for correcting purposes. Kings, on the other hand were expected to 
mete out corporal punishments and liberally. Id. at ch. 9, § 230. “On women, infants, men of disor-
dered mind, the poor and the sick, the king shall inflict punishment with a whip, a cane, or a rope 
and the like.” Id. 
 90. JOSEPH CONRAD, UNDER WESTERN EYES: A NOVEL 25 (1911). A Western mind “would 
not have an hereditary and personal knowledge of the means by which an historical autocracy re-
presses ideas, guards its power, and defends its existence.” Id. 
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Accounts like Joseph Conrad’s are the subject of elegy as evidence 
of progressive legal reform and change. This has been a classic myth of 
Western progress. In the popular narrative, this change alone is thought 
to distinguish our modern present from the barbarous past.91 Despite its 
popularity as a progress narrative, the precise terms through which this 
legal change occurred have been left unexamined. 
I outline four progress narratives in order to demonstrate differ-
ences.92 First, and most familiar, there is Sir Henry Maine’s rosy view 
detailing the decline of status relations as inevitable in the march of pro-
gress toward contract.93 Was the decline of violence actually the natural 
side-effect of the move from status to contract? Does it really instantiate 
the reform? 
The second explanation is that this form of “progress” was due to a 
humanitarian impulse. Humanitarian impulses are a noble explanation, 
which appeals to us as flattering our sense of “our better selves.” There 
has been extensive work on the subject of abolitionism.94 And the rise of 
abolitionism in political rhetoric and in literature95 could be considered a 
humanitarian impulse significantly contributing to the cessation of cor-
poral punishment. But who can predict when and why more sensitive 
impulses arise? Why does an accepted practice like cuffing a servant 
suddenly, (or even gradually) become the subject of humanitarian reflec-
tion? 
Third, historian Richard Morris suggests a more sophisticated ex-
planation: the humanitarian impulse only tells half of the story.96 He 
writes: “[J]ustice for the laboring man was precariously dependent upon 
                                                     
 91. Even nineteenth-century writers began to use the term “barbaric” to describe unregulated 
whipping. See, for example, REEVE, supra note 8, and annotations in the later nineteenth-century 
editions of William Blackstone, Commentaries. 
 92. There may be more. 
 93. See SIR HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF 
SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 109–65 (1861) (Fourth American from the 10th 
London ed. 1906). 
 94. See generally Clark, supra note 12. Clark criticizes Foucault’s approach for obscuring 
“particular uses of humanitarian rhetoric in struggles against such figures as masters and patriarchs, 
who in their traditional roles were deputized to use violence against their subordinates.” Id. at 491–
92. See generally RICHARD H. BRODHEAD, CULTURES OF LETTERS: SCENES OF READING AND 
WRITING IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 13–14 (1993); JAMES D. ESSIG, THE BONDS OF 
WICKEDNESS: AMERICAN EVANGELICALS AGAINST SLAVERY, 1770–1808 (1982); David Brion 
Davis, The Perils of Doing History by Ahistorical Abstraction, in THE ANTISLAVERY DEBATE: 
CAPITALISM AND ABOLITIONISM AS A PROBLEM IN HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 290–309 (Thomas 
Bender ed., 1992); Thomas L. Haskell, Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility, 
Part 2, in THE ANTISLAVERY DEBATE: CAPITALISM AND ABOLITIONISM AS A PROBLEM IN 
HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION, supra, at 136–60. 
 95. Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin published in 1852 was the single most popular 
book in the nineteenth century and the century’s longest running play on Broadway. 
 96. RICHARD B. MORRIS, GOVERNMENT AND LABOR IN EARLY AMERICA 523 (1946). 
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a fortuitous conjunction of the humanitarian impulses and economic in-
terests of those in power.”97 Humanitarian impulses may have been in-
sufficient to accomplish the reform by itself. Skeptics must then search 
for what those in power could gain from such a change. Morris’s thesis 
explains why a more powerful party might yield one of his preroga-
tives—that is, because it may actually serve other economic interests. 
The explanatory effectiveness of this narrative will be seen in the 
evidence that follows. Why the impulse arose and why there was am-
bivalence about eliminating the beatings of working subordinates in 
some settings may be revealed by seeing court cases as markers in a 
chronology and evolving classification schema. 
There is, of course, a fourth progress narrative provided by Max 
Weber,98 that the state takes over “a monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force” and “[t]he state is considered the sole source of the 
‘right’ to use violence.”99 Was the move away from workplace corporal 
punishment simply an act of state-evolution in Weberian terms? Did the 
end of master-inflicted violence spell the beginning of the state’s mo-
nopoly of this particular means of violence for social control? 
B. The Evidence 
To consider these hypotheses as well as to identify the dynamics of 
the demise of Blackstone’s rule, I turn to nineteenth-century treatise 
writers and law cases.100 
                                                     
 97. Id. This explanation received modern form in Derrick Bell’s works. 
 98. MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 78 
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1946). 
 99. Id. at 78. Max Weber’s theory identifies three inner justifications or basic legitimations of 
domination: the authority of the traditional, of the patriarch, of the eternal yesterday, and that of the 
legal. 
 First, the authority of the ‘eternal yesterday,’ i.e. of the mores sanctified through the 
unimaginably ancient recognition and habitual orientation to conform. This is ‘tradition-
al’ domination exercised by the patriarch . . . . 
 There is the authority of the extraordinary and personal gift of grace (charisma), the 
absolutely personal devotion and personal confidence in revelation, heroism, or other 
qualities of individual leadership. This is ‘charismatic’ domination, as exercised by the 
prophet or—in the field of politics—by the elected war lord, the plebiscitarian ruler, the 
great demagogue, or the political party leader. 
 [The third] is domination by virtue of ‘legality,’ by virtue of the belief in the validi-
ty of legal statute and functional ‘competence’ based on rationally created rules. 
Id. at 78–79. 
 100. I am keenly aware that different texts, newspapers, statutory codes, or even sermons or 
journals could be used as evidence to test the hypotheses about this social reform. 
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1. Nineteenth-Century Treatise Writers: Chastisement as a Common   
Refrain 
One way to track the legal changes taking place in this area is 
through the changes in legal discourse in influential treatises. Legal trea-
tises were extremely influential in the nineteenth century in organizing 
and disseminating law. Treatises functioned to help lawyers and judges 
find case citation in an era without digital searching, and even without 
Shepard’s citations. Legal treatises disseminated more recent rulings by 
listing them in the volume’s footnotes, in amplification of the principles 
stated in the main text. As new cases were decided, successive editions 
added them, sometimes in tiers of footnotes. This gave these treatises 
significant influence as the texts that articulated the common law for ex-
pansion into new territories where the law was not known. The treatises 
also inculcated common law theories in the training of new lawyers.  
Of all the nineteenth-century treatises, Blackstone’s Commentaries 
continued to be the most influential in American law. Almost all early 
nineteenth-century treatises structured their content around Blackstone’s 
“Master and Servant” chapter.101 Hence, Blackstone’s rule on corporal 
punishment—that masters were entitled to chastise their servants—was a 
refrain repeated in treatises over the entire century.102 Blackstone’s 
Commentaries continued to have broader appeal than did specialized 
treatises on the subject of master and servant. As Timothy Walker wrote 
in his book intended as an introduction for those studying law: “There is 
no work on American Law, at all suitable for a first book; and we are 
compelled, for want of such a work, to commence with Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on English law, to learn the rudiments of American 
law.”103 
                                                     
 101. For a description by a contemporary treatise writer of how treatises structured their chap-
ters, see SCHOULER, supra note 27, at 3–5. Chris Tomlins has divided nineteenth-century treatise 
writers into first- and second-stage treatise writers: first-stage followed Blackstone’s taxonomy, 
while second-stage departed from the taxonomy to provide a more universally available conceptual-
ization of master and servant. TOMLINS, supra note 13, at 266. With regard to corporal punishment 
the trend is the reverse. Blackstone stated the rule as a universal when he included the word “serv-
ant” as a relation susceptible to corporal punishment. Later treatises proceeded to limit the category 
more and more by an increasingly narrow definition of which servants were susceptible. 
 102. For Blackstonian replication, see treatises cited supra note 8. 
 103. TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW: DESIGNED AS A FIRST BOOK 
FOR STUDENTS 3 (1837). Though Walker wished for a truly American compendium, “Our great 
desideratum is, a work which would be to us, precisely what that work is to the English. And that 
man would be a great public benefactor, who should Americanize Blackstone’s Commentaries; that 
is, who should give this work with just such additions, omissions, and corrections, as would make it 
an accurate exposition of American law”, he realized that there could be none because “among the 
various obstacles in the way of such an enterprise, there is one, which if not insurmountable, is cer-
tainly formidable. I refer to the great diversity of state laws. This renders it almost impossible to 
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Yet, despite Blackstone’s prevalence and his clarity about masters’ 
prerogatives, it is difficult to find any American case supporting the rule. 
Where does one find an American case where a particular master’s beat-
ing was deemed legitimate by a court of law? Does the lack of cases sug-
gest that beatings did not occur or, instead, was the practice so well ac-
cepted that its legitimacy went unquestioned when beatings did occur? 
Or perhaps beatings occurred but it was simply impossible for servants to 
sue.104 
The case citation in the master-servant treatises is thin, and on the 
subject of chastisement almost threadbare.105 For instance, Hilliard in his 
treatise The Law of Torts or Private Wrongs gives a single, unusual ex-
ample: “With regard to the right of the master to chastise his servant, it 
has been held that a master has no right to flog a choir-boy of a cathedral 
for singing at private parties without his leave.”106 Even this example 
contrasts with rather than supports Blackstone’s rule. That a choir boy 
who sang elsewhere should not be whipped for doing so seems reasona-
ble. That in 1859 his master even considered it suggests how jealous and 
controlling masters could be. 
But by 1827, there are writings questioning the rule’s legitimacy in 
the name of contract. Writing in 1827, the influential Chancellor Kent in 
his commentaries stated: 
It is said that the master may give moderate corporal correction to 
his servant, while employed in his service, for negligence or misbe-
havior. . . . But this power does not grow out of the contract of hir-
ing; and [one English scholar] justly questions its lawfulness, for it 
is not agreeable to the genius and spirit of the contract.107 
Kent was already beginning to isolate its field of acceptibility with the 
sentence that followed: “And without alluding to seamen in the mer-
chants’ service, it may safely be confined to apprentices and menial serv-
ants while under age, for then the master is to be considered as standing 
in loco parentis.”108 
                                                                                                                       
prepare a work of any reasonable compass, which shall be equally adapted to every part of the Unit-
ed States; and yet sufficiently full and complete, to answer the end proposed.” Id. at 4. 
 Since there could never be an American counterpart to Blackstone, Blackstone’s Commen-
taries continued to occupy the central role of organizing the common law, and master-servant law, 
for most states. 
 104. See discussion supra accompanying notes 31–32. 
 105. I used a similar method to generate numerous cases on negative specific performance and 
seduction for two previous articles on master and servant. 
 106. 2 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS 569 (1859) (citing 
Newman v. Bennett, 2 Chit. R. 195 (Eng.)). 
 107. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 307 (Boston, Little, Brown and 
Company, 10th ed. 1860). The English legal scholar that Kent referred to was Doctor Taylor. 
 108. Id. 
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Other treatises continued to state that “[t]he master has a right to 
give moderate corporal correction to his servant for disobedience to his 
lawful commands, negligence in his business, or for insolent behav-
ior.”109 Yet, despite this mid-century hesitation to condone chastise-
ment—one might say ambivalence toward the practice—none of the trea-
tise writers seemed prepared to condemn workplace corporal punishment 
entirely.110 
In the 1870s treatise writers openly questioned its legality. James 
Schouler and H.G. Wood both wrote treatises in the 1870s and both con-
cluded that, generally, corporal punishment was illegal but was reserved 
for special cases. Both suggested that the master’s alternative to chastis-
ing hired servants was “either to bring an action against him, or . . . ‘to 
expel the lazy drone from his family, and leave him to his own beggarly 
condition.’”111 
But Schouler and Wood differed upon the significant issue of 
whether employers needed reasons to expel a worker from employment. 
While Schouler implied that reasons were necessary for such drastic ac-
tion, Wood took the opposite position.  
Schouler expressed concern that the master–servant relationship en-
tailed caste-like circumstances that were unsuited to the American repub-
lic. He exalted the republican thinking that masters and servants should 
be social equals in America, and he invoked concerns about power dis-
parity when concerning certain workplace common law rules. Schouler 
went to some length to describe the reasons that justified the master in 
terminating the relationship. 
                                                     
 109. Reeve ended such a broad and open statement with a qualification: “This, however, is 
confined to apprentices and menial servants, who are members of his family; and not, indeed, to all 
such, if of full age, as hired men of full age . . . . If other servants be thus corrected, they may leave 
the master’s service.” REEVE, supra note 8, at 534. The treatise also repeats Kent’s earlier observa-
tion: that chastisement “does not grow out of the contract of hiring, and . . . [is] not being consonant 
with the spirit and genius of contract.” Id. at 534–35 n.1. 
 110. Torts treatise writers were prepared to abandon the master’s exception earlier than master-
servant writers. In 1873, Torts treatise writer, Thomas W. Waterman wrote: “Except in the case of 
sailors the master cannot lawfully chastise his hired servant. If he beat his servant, though moderate-
ly and by way of correction, it is good ground for the servant’s departure, and the servant may sup-
port an action against the master for the battery.” 1 THOMAS W. WATERMAN, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF TRESPASS IN THE TWOFOLD ASPECT OF THE WRONG AND THE REMEDY 186 (New York, 
Baker, Voorhis & Co., Publishers 1875). 
 111. See, e.g., SCHOULER, supra note 27, at 658 (quoting Pufendorf). Both Schouler and Wood 
appear to have borrowed upon the British Charles Manley Smith. Smith was an English legal scholar 
but many of his treatises, like the one cited, were published and distributed in the United States as 
well. SMITH, supra note 8, at 126. Smith carefully qualified the terms for this expulsion—the master 
must have good reasons for leaving a servant destitute by expelling him—and then proceeds to list 
and specify legitimate reasons, such as good cause, for expelling the servant. Id. at 113. Schouler 
repeated similar qualifications, but Wood did not. 
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We are now to inquire in what manner the relation of master and 
servant may be terminated. The causes which justify discharge by 
the master are various, and the rule depends somewhat upon the na-
ture of the particular employment in question. But most decisions 
are reducible to three leading classes: First, wilful disobedience of a 
lawful order; second, gross moral misconduct; third, habitual negli-
gence in business, or other serious detriment to the master’s inter-
ests.112 
Schouler also provided a nuanced account of the consequences for gen-
eral hirings where the term was not specified, suggesting that pay sched-
ules were good guidelines for determining the duration of employ-
ment.113 In essence, if work was to be terminated, servants should receive 
one payment upon termination, but, Schouler maintained, custom rather 
than rigid rule determined the scope of the master’s ability to terminate 
an employee in any particular setting. 
Wood was much more categorical. He stated: “The master has no 
right to chastise a servant for disobedience, negligence, or any cause ex-
cept such as would justify him in assaulting a stranger.”114 Wood twinned 
this statement with the following statement: “If the servant’s conduct is 
such as to merit punishment, the master’s only remedy is to discharge 
him.”115 
Gone from Wood’s statement is the qualification that the master 
needed reasons to expel the servant from his work and what conduct 
merited punishment. This is because Wood’s blockbuster innovation 
came later in the volume: it was not going to be that corporal punishment 
had ceased to be legally authorized, it was the introduction of the at-will 
doctrine. Wood stated categorically, “With us [we Americans] the rule is 
inflexible, that a general . . . hiring is prima facie a hiring at will.”116 
Thus, Wood reasoned as a consequence, “a mere hiring at will . . . may 
be put an end to by the master.”117 Period. Without qualifications and 
without needing justification or reasons. 
As we know, in time, Wood’s at-will rule won out. Later cases 
filled in the blanks of the privilege: a servant could be discharged not 
                                                     
 112. See SCHOULER, supra note 27, at 612. 
 113. See id. at 607. “We find at the outset, then, a distinction made in practice between serv-
ants, menial or domestic, and other servants; which distinction is founded upon a custom of dissolv-
ing the relation, not at the end of a year, but at any time upon giving the other a month’s wages.” Id. 
at 608. Schouler’s treatment is much more nuanced than Wood’s. Schouler spends several pages 
distinguishing the policies and circumstances that would affect the duration of hiring and grounds for 
terminations. Id. at 606–10. 
 114. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT, supra note 8, at 303–04. 
 115. Id. at 304. 
 116. Id. at 283. 
 117. Id. at 285. 
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only for good cause, but for bad cause or for no cause at all, just as feu-
dal peasants and at-will tenants could be.118 After the at-will rule came to 
prominence, employees could be suddenly expelled from the workplace 
and left to their beggarly condition without any justification at all. Previ-
ously the master’s exercise of dominance, physical chastisement was 
only justified by reasons, but no reasons conditioned terminating an em-
ployee under the at-will doctrine. Twenty years later in 1896, the century 
ended with Tiffany’s simple statement that “the master cannot chastise 
his servant,”119 and that specific prerogative was never resuscitated. To 
examine this change with a somewhat finer grain, one must look at the 
few cases upon which the treatises were based. 
2. In the Early Republic, the State Takes the Whip from the Master’s 
Hand: Milburne v. Byrne 
Although whipping and enslavement were regarded as affiliated 
circumstances by 1805, Milburne v. Byrne120 concerns the punishment of 
John Leonard, an Irish adult white man and fairly recent immigrant to 
America. Notwithstanding his demographic characteristics, John Leonard 
was whipped by the justice of the peace when he left one master and 
went to work for another. 
In the colonial and post-colonial period, both who was subject to 
bound labor and who was subject to workplace corporal punishment 
seem to have been more racially fluid. Persons of European descent as 
well as persons of African descent could be subject to indenture, en-
slavement, whipping, or a combination thereof for running away, failure 
to work, or circumstances amounting to a common law crime.121 If the 
                                                     
 118. See generally Payne v. W. & Atlantic R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884). 
 119. See TIFFANY, supra note 5, at 505 (emphasis added). 
 120. 17 F. Cas. 283 (C.C.D.C. 1805) (No. 9,542). This case is well-known because it is one of 
the few cases on master and servant listed in the first Centennial digest of American law. This case 
has also been analyzed by STEINFELD, supra note 27, at 134, 235–36. 
 121. See, e.g., 4 HELEN TUNNICLIFF CATTERALL, JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN 
SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO 469 (1968). 
 Re Haslewood, I Mass. Recs. 246, December 1638. “John Haslewood, being found 
guilty of severall thefts, and breaking into severall houses, was censured to bee severely 
whiped, and delivered up a slave to whom the Court shall appoint Giles Player, [for simi-
lar offences] . . . was censured to be severely whiped, and delivered up for a slave to 
whom the Court shall appoint.”  
 . . . . 
 Re Kempe, I Mass. Recs. 269, September 1639. “John Kempe, for filthy, uncleane 
attempts wth 3 yong girles, was censured to bee whiped both heare, at Roxberry, and at 
Salem, very severely, and was committed for a slave to Leif’t Davenport.”  
 . . . . 
 Re Dickerson, I Mass. Recs. 284, December 1639. “Thomas Dickerson was cen-
sured to bee severely whiped, and condemned to slavery.”  
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wrongdoer was already enslaved, the punishment would most likely be a 
whipping.122 If the wrongdoer was indentured, the person might be 
whipped and years might be added to their term. If, however, the wrong-
doer’s service was already life-long, there was then no point to a further 
deprivation of liberty. Whipping provided an additional penalty for 
someone whose liberty was already curtailed. Whipping in these instanc-
es responded to the lack of an ability to otherwise worsen the slacker’s 
status.  
Tremain writes that “[f]or some time slaves are scarcely mentioned 
in the laws [governing the District of Columbia]. The inference is that, in 
general, laws made for white servants would be applicable to slaves.”123 
Early statutes did not refer to slaves at all, they simply referred to bound 
servants and these statutes, written in terms of bound servants, came to 
be applied to slaves, rather than written for that legal category of persons 
as the target.124 Tremain notes that, generally, “laws concerning inden-
tured servants were applied to slaves, probably until the latter became the 
more numerous class.”125 
Milburne v. Byrne demonstrates both the state’s willingness to 
compel the enforcement of labor contracts through the courts as well as 
judicial reluctance to endorse violence as the means of enforcement.126 
The case, however, revolved around a statute that regulated violence.127 
The operative Virginia statute on master–servant relations authorized 
both the lawsuit and some kind of whipping.128 (Maryland had similar 
                                                                                                                       
 Re Savory, I Mass. Recs. 297, June 1640. “Thom: Savory, for breaking a house in 
the time of exercise, was censured to bee severely whiped, and for his theft to be sould 
for a slave until hee have made double restitution.” 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 122. William E. Nelson, The Utopian Legal Order of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, 1630–
1686, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 183, 217–18 (2005); see also CATTERALL, supra note 121, at 469–534. 
 123. TREMAIN, supra note 9, at 30. She adds: “Some [laws], passed as early as 1715, were in 
force in the District of Columbia up to 1862. Those relating to servants and slaves were especially 
severe. In both States these laws had been considerably modified even before 1800.” Id. at 13. 
 124. Id. at 36. 
 125. Id. at 54. An increasing severity of the measures may be noticed during the change from 
the system of indentured service to that of slavery. “By the laws of 1782 and 1796, in Alexandria 
and Washington counties respectively, emancipation was allowed, and by the acts of 1799 and 1796 
the sale of free persons was prohibited.” Id. 
 126. Milburne v. Byrne, 17 F. Cas. 283 (C.C.D.C. 1805) (No. 9,542). 
 127. Id. 
 128. 1 THE REVISED CODE OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH 
ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OF A PUBLIC AND PERMANENT NATURE, AS ARE NOW IN FORCE 
418–19 (Richmond, Thomas Ritchie 1792) [hereinafter REVISED CODE] (referencing “An Act Reduc-
ing Into One, the Several Acts Concerning Servants,” ch. 110, § IV–V); A COLLECTION OF ALL 
SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA OF A PUBLIC AND PERMANENT NATURE AS 
HAVE PASSED SINCE THE SESSION OF 1801, at 228 (Richmond, Samuel Pleasants, Junior 1808) 
[hereinafter COLLECTION]. The Virginia statute was in force in the District of Columbia by reason of 
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statutes.129) The Virginia statute authorized a justice of the peace to order 
that a servant be whipped for running away, which was how Leonard’s 
departure was viewed.130 
Like many others, John Leonard came to America from Ireland, ap-
parently on passage paid by another. Once in this country, Leonard exe-
cuted an indenture promising to work for Milburne for eight months in 
exchange for Milburne relieving him of his pre-existing debt.131 When 
Leonard left Milburne before the expiration of his eight-month term and 
went to work for Byrne, Milburne sued Byrne for enticing his servant 
away. Milburne also had John Leonard whipped by the justice of the 
peace under a local statute authorizing servants to be whipped.132 Mil-
burne’s two responses are illuminating: one sued men of equal or higher 
status (assuming one had the wherewithal to sue), and one whipped low-
er-class men. 
Milburne prevailed on the enticement action against the other em-
ployer,133 but the whipping was declared illegal.134  
Based upon the statute, the court declared Leonard’s whipping ille-
gal because the contract that indentured Leonard was executed in the 
United States. The court held that since that indenture was signed in the 
                                                                                                                       
the fact that Virginia statutes applied south of the Potomac on District land that was originally part 
of Virginia. TREMAIN, supra note 9, at 11. 
 According to Cranch, 
The laws thus adopted [by act of 1801] consisted of so much of the common law of Eng-
land as was applicable to this country; of bills of rights, constitution, and statutes of Vir-
ginia and Maryland, modified by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and also 
(in regard to that part of the District which was ceded by the State of Maryland) of such 
of the English statutes as existed at the time of the first emigration to Maryland, “and 
which by experience had been found applicable to their local and other circumstances, 
and of such others as had been since made in England or Great Britain, and had been in-
troduced, used, and practised by the courts of law or equity” of that State. 
Id. at 12–13. The Virginia statute was subsequently copied in the Northwest Territory. 
 129. Milburne, 17 F. Cas. at 284. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Alexander Smith was the holder of John Leonard’s original debt. Although Smith is a 
common name, “Alexander Smith” was involved in several other cases in Cranch Reports for the 
District of Columbia. The nature of these cases suggests that he was some sort of broker of laborers 
since the other suits involved matters of finance and slaves (presumably to the person who had paid 
Leonard’s passage). 
 132. Milburne, 17 F. Cas. at 284. 
 133. Although the court declined to validate the whipping, it allowed Milburne to prevail 
against Leonard’s second master and accepted an evidentiary presumption very favorable to his 
original master. Essentially, Milburne did not need to show that the second master had actively en-
ticed Leonard. It was sufficient to show that Leonard was now working for him. Id. 
 This meant that Leonard was not free to quit. The court ruling effectively eliminated all of 
Leonard’s other employment options by imposing a civil liability for loss of his services upon any 
prospective employer. Leonard might flee, but he couldn’t get work in order to eat. 
 134. Id. 
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United States and not in Ireland, it was not within the statute’s specific 
terms and, hence, the whipping was unauthorized and illegal.  
Although the court declared Leonard’s whipping illegal, it ex-
pressed no condemnation of the fact that this adult white man had been 
whipped. Leonard was not a party to this suit, but there is also no record 
of any follow-up to provide Leonard compensation for being subjected to 
a whipping illegal under the statute. 
In declaring Leonard’s whipping illegal, the case holding has a dis-
tinctly new world flavor in which the situs of the contract’s formation, as 
occurring in the new world, is salient. “A contract made in this country 
does not create such a relation of master and servant as will authorize a 
justice of the peace to compel a specific service, and to inflict stripes for 
disobedience, under the [statute].”135 Such a contract made in Ireland 
could conceivably be enforced by a whipping. But that wasn’t Leonard’s 
situation. The court implicitly drew this line, implying that even though 
“they” (Old Worlders) may be subject to “barbaric” penalties such as 
whipping as a means to enforce those contracts, this was an American 
contract of indenture; thus, the whipping was invalid. 
As to the importation of indentured laborers, this formalism is ra-
ther silly. Byrne’s attorney took pains to point out that Leonard had 
signed some sort of contract in Ireland.136 In all probability that contract 
paid for passage to America, and that contract had produced the debt 
which Milburne then paid on Leonard’s behalf.137 What difference 
should the situs make in enforcing a contractual debt?138 Presumably, 
none at all, but after this ruling, the situs of the debt determined which 
master could subject a servant to whipping for running away. This pre-
rogative of mastery was not transferable as the debt and labor obligation 
was transferable by successive contracts made first outside and then in-
side the United States. Pragmatically, the distinction creates a new divi-
sion between the consequences for a new world master of buying an in-
dentured servant and buying a slave.  
                                                     
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. For a comprehensive account of the redemptioner’s practice, see DAVID GALENSON, 
WHITE SERVITUDE IN COLONIAL AMERICA: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1984). 
 138. As a legal matter, why should the Court quibble about whether Leonard’s indebtedness 
was made directly to Milburne when he was in Ireland, or whether it was made initially to another 
party and then transferred to Milburne? One possible doctrinal answer would be privity. Certainly, 
privity was still an important concept in the early nineteenth century and a punitive statute like Vir-
ginia’s should be narrowly construed. But the court did not bother to consider whether Leonard came 
into the country on a “contract to serve another” under the strict terms of the Virginia statute and 
whether that legislative enactment was for the benefit of assignees of the indentured immigrant’s 
debt every bit as much as for the original creditor who procured the immigrant’s passage. Milburne, 
17 F. Cas. at 284. 
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The Virginia statute deserves a closer look. Consider another spe-
cific provision of the Virginia statute. The statute also delimited the cir-
cumstances in which whipping would be deemed appropriate.139 The 
provision recited the circumstances: “Any such servant, being lazy, dis-
orderly, guilty of misbehavior to his master, or in his master’s family, 
shall be corrected by stripes, on order from the justice . . . .”140 This lim-
ited the master’s discretion to impose punishment by providing reasons 
when such extreme punishment could be resorted to.141 By including 
these conditional circumstances, the statute limited the authorization of 
violence. By stating a specified list of reasons that could justify beating, 
the statute accordingly proscribed other rationales.142 The master no 
longer enjoyed the prerogative of beating the servant on a whim, beating 
at will, beating out of despair, out of spite, out of bad humor, frustration, 
drunkenness, class or ethnic hatred, or economic downturn or ill-fortune. 
The servant’s misfortune in being whipped was authorized, but limited to 
specific justifications that the state recognized as legitimate. 
The Virginia statute maintained the dominance of class in that it ac-
corded masters and servants quite different nonreciprocal rights.143 But, 
importantly, it prohibited the master whipping a servant simply because 
he was master and the subject was servant and it qualified those behav-
iors that were acceptable in the class relation.144 
This statute illustrates a broader precept about punishment in West-
ern culture. An activity as extreme as whipping required that there be 
reasons that justified the action, reasons couched in terms of the victim’s 
culpability. For an example, consider Stedman’s famous accounts of a 
trip to Surinam, a book that played an important role in the early anti-
slavery movement in Britain. Stedman routinely distinguishes the many 
floggings that he witnessed in terms of the reasons that the action was 
taken.145 Instances of flogging for very slight reasons or for no reasons at 
                                                     
 139. See REVISED CODE, supra note 128, at 419 (referencing “An Act Reducing Into One, the 
Several Acts Concerning Servants,” ch. 110, § IV); COLLECTION, supra note 128, at 227. 
 140. REVISED CODE, supra note 128, at 419. 
 141. See id.; COLLECTION, supra note 128, at 227. 
 142. These reasons were somewhat open-textured, but they were much more limited than 
whenever the master wanted to strike the servant or felt like doing so. 
 143. REVISED CODE, supra note 128, at 418–19 (referencing “An Act Reducing Into One, the 
Several Acts Concerning Servants,” ch. 110, §§ II, IV, VII); COLLECTION, supra note 128, at 247–
48. 
 144. REVISED CODE, supra note 128, at 418–19 (referencing “An Act Reducing Into One, the 
Several Acts Concerning Servants,” ch. 110 §§ II, IV, VII); COLLECTION, supra note 128, at 247–48. 
 145. See generally 1 JOHN GABRIEL STEDMAN, NARRATIVE OF A FIVE YEARS’ EXPEDITION, 
AGAINST THE REVOLTED NEGROES OF SURINAM, IN GUIANA, ON THE WILD COAST OF SOUTH 
AMERICA; FROM THE YEAR 1772, TO 1777: ELUCIDATING THE HISTORY OF THAT COUNTRY, AND 
DESCRIBING ITS PRODUCTIONS . . . WITH AN ACCOUNT OF THE INDIANS OF GUIANA, & NEGROES OF 
GUINEA (London, 2d ed. 1813). 
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all call forth Stedman’s strongest condemnation.146 The severity of the 
punishment required some culpability on the victim’s part and some pro-
portionality. 
The Virginia statute went further by providing servants certain spe-
cific benefits, too. The statute guaranteed minimal terms of survival for 
the servant for the duration of his service.147 For example, the statute ob-
ligated that the master provide the servant with “wholsome [sic] and suf-
ficient food, cloathing and lodging . . . .”148 Further, the servant was 
guaranteed freedom wages at the end of service.149 The statute also pro-
vided a forum to redress the servant’s grievance of ill-treatment.150  
On close reflection, the Virginia statute served another purpose. 
Ironically, but importantly, the statute may be seen as a means of pro-
gressive law reform at the very time that it inscribes legal authorization 
of violence—the permission for masters to use physical violence against 
servants—as a matter of statute. In all likelihood, before this statute was 
enacted, it was simply customary that employers themselves whipped 
their servants, sometimes brutally or for sufficiently slight of a provoca-
tion. Prior to the statute, no positive law authorized the whipping of serv-
ants. Beating a servant (even with a whip) was probably considered a 
prerogative that the master, as the more powerful individual, assumed by 
virtue of his unfettered power. The statutory reform prevented unduly 
                                                     
 146. See generally id. A slave was whipped for the non-performance of a task to which he was 
apparently unequal. Id. at 215. Another slave was severely flogged “only for breaking a tumbler.” Id. 
at 236. Particularly outrageous in Stedman’s account were those slave owners like one “lady, who 
flogged her negro slaves for every little trifle.” Id. at 517. One slave was flogged for “coughing, who 
had a severe cold.” Id. at 174. Still another for failure to rinse out the glasses, spoiling the ragout, 
refusing to work, and for oversleeping. Id. at 321, 517. 
 Non-work related instances of flogging were appearing “in the streets or on the river, without a 
proper pass signed by his owner.” Id. at 306. 
 147. See REVISED CODE, supra note 128, at 418. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Servants were also secured some limited control of the masters to whom they could be 
assigned in that contracts of service were assignable only with the servant’s consent, the voluntari-
ness of which was overseen by the justice of the peace. Id. 
 150. REVISED CODE, supra note 128, at 419 (“If any master shall fail in the duties prescribed 
by this act, or shall be guilty of injurious demeanor towards his servant, it shall be redressed on 
motion, by the court . . . wherein the servant resides, by immediate discharge from service, if the 
injury were gross, or by a specific order for a change in his demeanor, and a discharge from service, 
if such order be disobeyed.”).  
 The Virginia statute was in effect in this area of the District of Columbia, but Maryland statutes 
similarly regulated masters’ harsh treatment of servants. TREMAIN, supra note 9, at 34–35. “In 
Maryland, by act of 1715, any one not providing sufficient food and clothing for a servant or slave, 
or excessively beating or burdening him with hard labor, or giving above ten lashes for any one 
offence, the same being sufficiently proved before the justices of the county courts, might be fined 
not to exceed one thousand pounds of tobacco. Virginia had similar laws to insure the good treat-
ment of servants and slaves. There are many rumors, though perhaps no well authenticated account 
of actual violations of these statutes.” Id. 
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severe and unfair whippings.151 But by outlawing only these abuses of 
the practice, the reform also served the authorizing function that legiti-
mated whipping, an extralegal practice previously not directly sanctioned 
by law.  
Moreover, this reform legitimated the practice of whipping of serv-
ants precisely at the time that it took the whip out of the master’s hands. 
The statute took the leather strap from the master’s hand and put it in the 
hands of an officer of the state, doing the master’s bidding with the au-
thorization of the justice of the peace.152 This may in fact have been a 
moderating influence if the sheriff was expected to whip more dispas-
sionately; a master may have been tempted to whip out of anger or 
vengeance. The statute regulated the number of stripes as well. The civi-
lizing reform indirectly gave the master something as well; by articulat-
ing the acceptable limits, it directly authorized a prerogative which pre-
viously had only been assumed and engaged in extralegally. 
The case raises the question then of how we evaluate legal reform. 
Was this Virginia statute a progressive move at all? Or was it instead an 
example of legal change as a pattern of compromise where the stronger 
parties’ interests actually were served by the purportedly progressive 
changes of law? The implication is that as long as the stronger party still 
sits at the table while reform is being negotiated, any legal change will 
accommodate or enhance patterns of compromise in which the stronger 
parties’ interests are accommodated or perhaps actually served by the 
new law. If the stronger party participates in the legislative compromise 
claimed to be a reform,153 the stronger party will always attempt to retain 
and may succeed in re-securing some measure of its previous prerogative 
of power. This re-securing of privilege further legitimates the exercise of 
that prerogative previously enjoyed, but perhaps not previously articulat-
ed as law, that is, the prerogative of dominance. 
                                                     
 151. See REVISED CODE, supra note 128, at 419 (referencing “An Act Reducing Into One, the 
Several Acts Concerning Servants,” ch. 110, §§ IV–V, VII); COLLECTION, supra note 128, at 227–
28. 
 152. This is similar to provisions in New Jersey. Gary K. Wolinetz, New Jersey Slavery and 
the Law, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2227, 2232 (1998) (explaining that “upon conviction (before two 
justices of the peace and without a jury), the owner of the slave was required to reimburse the dam-
aged party and pay the constable the costs to whip his slave not more than ‘forty stripes’”). 
 Along the same lines, Chancellor Kent mentions that early New England towns would appoint 
a paid “whipper.” “[E]ach town was authorized to appoint a common whipper for their slaves, to 
whom a salary was to be allowed.” KENT, supra note 107, at 255. 
 153. Slave masters’ interests were completely vanquished in the enactment of the Thirteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution, in part because with secession most slave states were no longer 
represented in Congress. VanderVelde, Labor Vision, supra note 2, at 443. 
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This is perhaps why Richard Morris’s explanation seems so plausi-
ble.154 The humanitarian impulse may be the impetus to progressive legal 
change; the fortuitous conjunction of the impulse with the economic in-
terests of those in power allows it to happen in such a way that the more 
powerful parties receive something in return.  
Under the obligations placed upon masters by the Virginia statute, 
masters were never exposed to similarly heavy sanctions.155 When a mas-
ter violated the relationship’s terms, it does not seem that the servant 
would be entitled to damages or even to have punishment visited upon 
the master. Instead, if the master breached one of his statutory duties, the 
servant could be discharged from further service to that master.156 Dis-
charge from service was the remedy for each and every servant’s griev-
ance regardless of severity!157 The one and only remedy for any wrong-
fully abused servant was simply to be able to exit the relationship. One 
wonders if the servant would be entitled to freedom dues for the prema-
ture end of the servant’s bound term, or whether the servant left penni-
less as he sought a new source of support. 
There is a modern counterpart even to this. Leaving the job as the 
only appropriate legal response for the master’s breach of duty has been 
retained in employment conceptualizations. The colloquial expression is 
that the remedy for the master’s abuse of the servant, whether the abuse 
was overwork, undernourishing, failing to clothe or shelter the servant or 
actual physical abuse, the beating of his head against the wall, is simply 
“to get the master to stop,” to release the servant from the master’s thrall, 
rather than to actually redress the aggrieved circumstances in the first 
place. Similarly, in modern employment settings, extreme overreaching 
by employers is often met with the similar societal response: the employ-
ee should simply have quit as soon as the employer’s bad behavior be-
gan. Exit is the one and only cure. 
The Virginia statute also drew express racial and citizenship lines. 
The statute limited the individuals covered by the statute in both racial 
and citizenship terms. At first blush, interpreted in the context of a mixed 
labor system that encompassed both slaves and indentured employees, 
                                                     
 154. See MORRIS, supra note 96. 
 155. The lack of reciprocity, the lack of symmetry between those occupying the position of 
master and those occupying other classes was also apparent in the conversion table for penalties for 
crimes. In those circumstances in which free persons normally would be fined for a crime, a servant 
would be whipped at the exchange rate of twenty lashes for every eight dollars. REVISED CODE, 
supra note 128, at 419 (referencing “An Act Reducing Into One, the Several Acts Concerning Serv-
ants,” ch. 110, § V); COLLECTION, supra note 128, at 228 (listing consequences upon the master 
(with whipping noticeably missing)). 
 156. See sources cited supra note 128. 
 157. See sources cited supra note 128. 
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the legislation appears to draw a racial line. The act specifically applies 
to “all white persons, not being citizens of any of the confederated states 
of America, who shall come into this commonwealth under contract, to 
serve another in any trade or occupation.”158 Within its ambit were white 
indentured servants, white redemptioners, white individuals held to debt 
service, and white alien apprentices. Outside the ambit would be two ra-
cially distinct groups: first, all persons of African heritage;159 and second, 
all white persons who were also citizens. Although the Virginia statute 
did not apply to Americans of African descent, it legitimated the remain-
ing practices by bifurcating the excluded classes into one privileged and 
one nonprivileged. Lest white citizen-servants be excluded from the ben-
eficial provisions of the statute, a further provision provided courts with 
jurisdiction over the complaints of servants who were citizens of any of 
the states.160   
3. Corporal Punishment Is Deemed Neither Transferable nor               
Delegable 
Fathers sometimes came to the aid of children who were chastised 
excessively by their masters.161 The presence of some other person, the 
apprentice’s father, with full legal capacity to sue on the articles of ap-
prenticeship, was crucial in challenging these abuses. The father’s legal 
capacity to object to his child’s abuse was premised on his right to his 
child’s services and the relation of privity he had to the master in con-
tracting the bonds of apprenticeship.162 
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, supervisors in manu-
facturing concerns attempted to use a leather strap against unruly boys 
                                                     
 158. REVISED CODE, supra note 128, at 419 (referencing “An Act Reducing Into One, the Sev-
eral Acts Concerning Servants,” ch. 110, § I) (emphasis added). 
 159. The Virginia statute drew one more explicitly racial line. It precluded people of color 
from entering the class of masters who could hold white servants. “No negro, mulatto, or Indian, 
shall at any time purchase any servant, other than of their own complexion, and if any of the persons 
aforesaid shall, nevertheless, presume to purchase a white servant, such servant shall immediately 
become free, and be so held, deemed and taken.” Id. at 420 (referencing “An Act Reducing Into One, 
the Several Acts Concerning Servants,” ch. 110, § IX). 
 160. COLLECTION, supra note 128, at 248. 
 161. See RORABAUGH, supra note 75, at 43 (discussing how an apprentice’s father “wrote a 
frank letter to a friend concerning his son and [his son’s master]”). Similarly, fathers came to the aid 
of daughters who were seduced while in service to a different master under the tort of seduction. See 
generally VanderVelde, Legal Ways, supra note 1. 
 162. Various state reporters include suits by fathers against masters for the ill-treatment of their 
sons. The only other option available to sons was the unlawful one of running away to the west or to 
sea (the sailing trade was always ready to enlist disaffected apprentices). 
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who were working in factories.163 Two suits, one in Connecticut and the 
other in Pennsylvania, set the course for legal development. 
In the 1823 case of Commonwealth v. Baird,164 the judge distin-
guished the legitimacy of striking apprentices, who had been formally 
bound under articles of indenture, from that of striking other young 
workers like fourteen-year-old William Mervine, the young man in ques-
tion. William’s father hired him out to the factory. Due to William’s 
youth and his father’s participation in the boy’s hire, he could have been 
mistaken for an apprentice. Apprenticeship followed much the same 
structure: fathers bound their underage sons out as apprentices to work 
for masters, although each state had strict formal technicalities to estab-
lish the bonds of apprenticeship. The defendant impleaded as a defense 
that given William’s young age, he could appropriately be “castigated” 
by his employers, their foreman, or overseers. 
The court declared otherwise. In Pennsylvania, children could be 
bound out as apprentices to learn a trade165 but William was not hired to 
receive any special training. “[O]ur courts have always frowned upon 
every attempt to bind them out as servants.”166 The term, servant, used 
here signified lowered status and diminished opportunity. Mervine’s fa-
ther “had neither the right or inclination to put his child in the station of a 
servant.”167 Conceding Blackstone’s directive, the Pennsylvania court 
instructed that the provision was inapplicable because this particular boy, 
William Mervine, was not apprenticed—he was a mere servant.168 This, 
the court concluded, notwithstanding Blackstone’s explicit mention that 
the “master may by law correct his servant” as well as his apprentice.169 
Further, the court distinguished American law from English law de-
claring that even if in England, servants can be whipped, that has no ef-
fect under our laws. This suggests somewhat smugly that Americans 
need not look to English practices.170 
                                                     
 163. Commonwealth v. Baird, 1 Ashmead 267 (1828); Matthews v. Terry, 10 Conn. 455 
(1835). 
 164. 1 GEORGE WARTON PEPPER & WILLIAM DRAPER LEWIS, PEPPER AND LEWIS’ NEW 
DIGEST: A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM 1700 TO 1894, at 153 (Philadelphia, T. & 
J.W. Johnson & Co., 1896) (referencing Commonwealth v. Baird, 1 Ashmead 267 (1828)). 
 165. Commonwealth v. Baird, 1 Ashmead 267, 268 (1828) (“Children may be bound appren-
tice to some useful trade, art or mystery, but our courts have always frowned upon every attempt to 
bind them out as servants.”). 
 166. Id. (emphasis added). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 267. 
 169. The court claimed it could find no decision in which the same power extended to servants 
in the broad and popular sense of the term. Id. 
 170. The court mistakenly inverted the relationship between master’s self-help in punishing 
their servants and state-assisted punishment. The court opined that that statutes to regulate laborers 
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The Baird case could have come out the other way if Blackstone’s 
rule had held sway. Whipping an apprentice seemed no more or less jus-
tified than whipping a young boy classified as a mere servant. Employers 
needed some form of workplace discipline. Large factories required 
many “hands” and a hierarchical structure of intermediate supervisors for 
the purpose of task organization and workplace discipline. The defend-
ant, Baird, had superintendence of the room,171 and Baird was the man 
who had beaten William severely with a leather strap. The Pennsylvania 
court declared not only that youthful William was not susceptible to 
whipping, but also, another reason, that the law did not authorize a su-
pervisor to whip anyone because the prerogative of corporal punishment 
could not be delegated. By declaring that the privilege of exercising cor-
poral punishment over an underling was not delegable, the court made 
this method of discipline unsuited to the modernizing factory workplace.  
The allowable dimensions of corporal punishment in the Baird case 
contrast with John Leonard’s vulnerability to whipping under the Virgin-
ia statute in force in the District of Columbia. John Leonard was suscep-
tible to the whipping penalties, although he was an adult white man, but 
not upon a writ instigated by Milburne, the assignee of the Leonard’s 
debt. Under the statute, only a party to the original debt incurred outside 
the United States, (presumably the person who had financed Leonard’s 
passage) could have him whipped under the statute. Milburne v. Byrne 
held that the prerogative was not transferable (alienable) to the assignee 
who undertook Leonard’s debt in exchange for the promise of his labor. 
Importers of labor could avail themselves of corporal punishment under 
the statute, but not their assignees. 
In Commonwealth v. Baird, the court went further in restricting 
corporal punishment by declaring that the authority to inflict such pun-
ishment was not delegable. Blackstone and Bacon had written that the 
master alone can beat the servant.172 “The same authorities which recog-
nize the right of the master to beat the servant deny his right to delegate 
that authority to another.”173 Accordingly, though Baird was the interme-
diate manager in charge of the shop floor and had the obligation to keep 
                                                                                                                       
and servants in England, such as the Statute of Laborers and Artificers, had been enacted because the 
master lacked the authority to punish his servants himself. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 268. Blackstone had stated simply that although a master may beat apprentices, his 
wife may not. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *428. “A master may, by law, correct his 
apprentice [or servant] for negligence or other misbehavior, so it be done with moderation; though, if 
the . . . master’s wife beats . . . it is good cause of departure.” Id. (emphasis added). The line of dele-
tation could also have been drawn based upon gender—that wives held insufficient authority to 
correct their husbands’ apprentices. 
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order, he had no right to beat any of the thirty boys in his workroom in 
order to maintain discipline.174 That right, if it existed at all, attached on-
ly to the person designated as the boy’s master, not to a supervisor or 
overseer hired by the master. Therefore, the court concluded that Baird, 
the supervisor, had committed assault and battery because the organiza-
tional structure of the workplace gave him no legal defense.175 Thus, 
even with the words of Blackstone, words often repeated as authorizing 
corporal punishment, factory owners could not immunize their supervi-
sors if they chastised the workers.  
This meant that large scale factories would need other means of 
workplace discipline. During the 1830s and 1840s, American manufac-
turing and transportation enterprises substantially grew in scale.176 
Workplace organization continued to evolve into new business forms, 
such as corporations of stockholders supplanting small-scale artisan 
workshops. Factories needed efficient methods of discipline that were 
both legally transferable and legally delegable. American Southern slav-
ery solved the problem by allowing such authority to be extended. In the 
South, large plantations adopted an overseer system for the management 
of multiple slaves. The overseer’s authority was delegated to him by the 
master, the slave’s owner, and when the slave was sold, the master’s au-
thority to whip him was transferable to the new master along with own-
ership of the slave. 
In the North, a different mechanism for discipline would take its 
place: the at-will doctrine. With the emergence of the at-will doctrine, 
workers would become vulnerable to discipline through having insecure 
jobs dependent on the pleasure of their employers. Under the at-will doc-
trine, employees could be expelled without justification, “for no reason at 
all or for bad reasons.”177 This new method of workplace punishment 
would assume two incidents of authority that corporal punishment 
lacked: it would become both transferable and delegable. (Still later, 
middle manager supervisors would be recognized as having a constitu-
tional liberty to terminate workers, a liberty that even the middle manag-
er supervisors could not be deprived of by duly enacted legislation.178) 
In 1835, in the Connecticut case of Matthews v. Terry, an American 
court effectively reversed the Blackstonian rule announcing that masters 
                                                     
 174. Reeve then popularized the ruling of Commonwealth v. Baird, stating, “In Pennsylvania 
the right is expressly denied . . . and the better opinion now is that it cannot be extended beyond 
apprentices and menial servants under age.” REEVE, supra note 8, at 534–35 n.1. 
 175. Baird, 1 Ashmead at 267–69. 
 176. TOMLINS, supra note 13, at 284. 
 177. Payne v. W. & Atlantic R.R Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (1884). 
 178. See generally Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 
(1908). 
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could not chastise their servants.179 By 1835, physical chastisement was 
clearly losing social acceptability.180 In this case, a master had horse-
whipped a troublesome fourteen-year-old boy who worked in his clock 
factory.181 When the young man sued for assault and battery, his youth 
was again an issue. The court stated that “[h]ad he been of full age, it 
would hardly be claimed, that he would have been liable to corporal 
chastisement.”182 Yet, since he was underage, the court addressed the 
situation analogizing to the youthful statuses of apprenticeship and stu-
dents enrolled in schools. “There is no doubt but that, for just cause, a 
parent may reasonably correct his child, a master his apprentice, and a 
schoolmaster his pupil. Yet that power cannot be lawfully exercised, by a 
master over his hired servant, whether that servant is employed in hus-
bandry, in manufacturing business, or in any other manner, except in the 
case of sailors. And if the master beat such servant, though moderately, 
and by way of correction, it is good ground for the servant’s departure; 
and he may support an action against the master for battery.”183 
Since there are so very few cases concerning workplace chastise-
ment, we can’t know how these decisions fell within the nation’s experi-
ence in tens of thousands of workplaces. The two boys were severely 
whipped, an aggravation that might have pressed them on to seek legal 
recourse. How many more workers struck less severely simply let the 
incident pass or walked away? Matthews found an attorney to press 
charges in civil assault, and Mervine pursued criminal assault charges. 
How many more workers failed to seek legal recourse because it was 
simply so far beyond their means, or beyond their ken, to do so? 
The 1835 decision in Matthews v. Terry may have occurred at the 
beginning or end of the change in norms. The three individuals whipped 
in these three cases—the Irish immigrant John Leonard, and the child 
laborers, William Mervine and young Matthews—were socially at the 
margins of American working society. The permission that Blackstone’s 
rule accorded to all masters generally had splintered into application only 
in particular categories of working people still further at the social mar-
gins. Physical chastisement increasingly became associated with those 
even more marginalized classes of workers, persons accorded less digni-
ty in the laboring schema, schoolchildren, slaves, and sailors. The further 
                                                     
 179. Matthews v. Terry, 10 Conn. 455, 455 (1835). 
 180. See text accompanying notes 251–253 infra. 
 181. Matthews, 10 Conn. at 456. 
 182. Id. at 458. 
 183. Id. (emphasis added). 
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marginalization of physical chastisement left it applicable only in those 
instances where employees could not effectively flee.184 
Notwithstanding these American courts’ disapproval of workplace 
corporal punishment, Blackstone continued to cast a long hoary shadow 
on American common law. Almost all lawyers and judges trained by 
reading Blackstone. Blackstone was almost universally regarded as au-
thoritative on the common law. Blackstone’s Commentaries was one of 
the best-selling books in the United States with multiple editions issued 
every decade.185 If lawyers were asked whether masters could beat their 
servants, Blackstone’s Commentaries is where they would check, and 
they wouldn’t find the ruling in Matthews v. Terry until it showed up in 
one of the later treatises. Employers could take some comfort in Black-
stone’s rule on correcting servants, if they chose to. 
4. Whipping Slaves in the Antebellum South to Discipline Them to Work 
It would be an oversight when examining this subject to overlook 
the obvious comparison to the circumstances of slaves. The objective is 
not simply to conclude that slaves were chattel property, but to demon-
strate how different the prerogatives of masters were as a result of the 
distinction. The point is not simply that masters could treat their slaves 
however they liked because slaves were their chattel property. The mes-
sage in the southern case law was instead that slaves should be beaten, to 
                                                     
 184. It is a defense if it can be shown that servant or scholar was merely being corrected by 
master, but if it “exceed the bonds of moderation and inflict cruel and merciless punishment, he is a 
trespasser, and liable to be punished by indictment.” FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE 
CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: COMPRISING A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COMMON AND CIVIL LAW 618 (Philadelphia, 4th ed. 1857). 
 While Bishop does not name master-servant relation specifically as a case where force is law-
ful, he does acknowledge the practice by saying that “if [one] inflicts legal chastisement to an illegal 
extent,—he becomes guilty of an assault. And, generally, any excess of authorized force will be 
criminal.” BISHOP, supra note 81, at 23, § 38. 
 Under the heading of “Assault,” May writes that a master may correct his apprentice and not be 
guilty of assault/battery, but  
“[t]his right, however, must be exercised with discretion, and must not, in degree or in 
kind of force, surpass the limits of necessity and appropriateness. The modern tendency is 
to construe strictly against the person using the force. . . . The mere relationship of master 
and servant . . . will not now, whatever may have been the law heretofore, authorize the 
use of force.” 
JOHN WILDER MAY, THE LAW OF CRIMES 193–94 (Joseph Henry Beale, Jr ed., Boston, 2d ed. 1893). 
 Emlin McClain adds: “Correction or restraint by one in loco parentis must be reasonable; in 
determining whether excessive, nature of instrument used should be considered by jury—if find 
immoderate or excessive, can infer malice—general rule: not reasonable if it causes lasting injury. 
See 1 EMLIN MCCLAIN, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 206–07 (1897). 
 185. The popularity of Blackstone’s Commentaries was rivaled only by the Bible and Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin in the nineteenth century. See WILFRID PREST, BLACKSTONE AND HIS COMMENTARIES: 
BIOGRAPHY, LAW, HISTORY (2009). 
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correct them, to induce them to work harder, and for purposes of main-
taining the social order. And furthermore, if a master did not keep his 
slaves orderly, the authority to beat slaves could be extended to others. 
While one struggles to find three lawsuits about workplace corporal 
punishment in northern courts, there are hundreds of common law cases 
mentioning the beatings of slaves in the southern states.186 Violence 
against slaves took place against a backdrop, not only of an ideology of 
racial hierarchy, but also one in which the cultural preference favored 
resolving all manner of disputes by private, often violent, means. For the 
most part, Southern gentlemen did not sue to resolve their disputes. Ra-
ther than turning to the courts, different measures of violence were pre-
ferred. In the South, dueling, lynching, and whipping were culturally pre-
ferred to invoking a more unitary punitive response from the state to re-
solve a conflict.187 Southern gentlemen settled conflicts by dueling.188 
Gentlemen cuffed or whipped lower-order men. And periodically, lower-
order men, like the Regulators or the Klan, ganging together in vigilante 
groups collectively imposed mob violence. Thus, in this social climate, it 
is not surprising that the case law reflected much higher numbers of in-
stances of the whipping of slaves and free Blacks than were ever record-
ed in the dockets of northern states with regard to servants or apprentic-
es. 
For a source of cases and further insight into corporal punishment’s 
supporting rationales, I turned to Helen Catterall’s extensive compendi-
                                                     
 186. Two excellent references on the violent practices to which slaves were subject are 
ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS: THE ECONOMICS OF 
AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (1995), and EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE 
WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1976). 
 187. VanderVelde, Legal Ways, supra note 1, at 836; W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN 
THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 1880–1930, at 86–87 (1993) (explaining that lynchings 
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“southerners during the late nineteenth century had lost faith in the courts”). Some scholars have 
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ties, lynching seemed to be reserved for two categories of men: those who engaged in sexual mis-
conduct, and those who grossly violated what the community understood to be appropriate patriar-
chal authority. See, e.g., RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE: HISTORICAL STUDIES 
OF AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND VIGILANTISM 214–18 (1975) (discussing lynching of African-
Americans in the post-Reconstruction South); Jane M. Pederson, Gender, Justice, and a Wisconsin 
Lynching, 1889–1890, 67 AGRIC. HIST. 65, 65–66 (1993) (discussing the lynching of a Norwegian 
immigrant by other Scandinavians in the community because he cruelly beat his wife and terrorized 
his children); Michael James Pfeifer, Iowa’s Last Lynching: The Charles City Mob of 1907 and Iowa 
Progressivism, 53 ANNALS IOWA 305 (1994) (examining the extralegal actions of a mob who hung a 
wealthy white man for the murder of his wife and son); see also EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE 
AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH-CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 266 (1984) (quot-
ing Thomas J. Kernan, The Jurisprudence of Lawlessness, 29 A.B.A. REP. 450, 451–53 (1906)); 
Richard Maxwell Brown, The History of Vigilantism in America, in VIGILANTE POLITICS 80–87 (H. 
Jon Rosenbaum & Peter C. Sederberg eds., 1976). 
 188. VanderVelde, Legal Ways, supra note 1. 
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um of slave cases.189 Helen Catterall methodically gathered court cases 
dealing with slavery and Free Blacks from each state. Using digital tech-
niques, I searched Catterall’s volumes and collected those cases that 
mentioned corporal punishment and classified them in terms of what 
triggered the case, where the violence was situated within legal cogni-
zance, and how such violence was portrayed in the legal decisions.190 
There was no shortage of cases involving circumstances where African-
Americans were whipped, and severely. In fact, from the perspective of 
the Catterall cases, the southern common law appears to be riven with 
the circumstances of beatings and floggings. These incidents run through 
the civil and criminal law dockets requiring judges to acknowledge the 
existence of violence and its relation to all manner of other legal rules, 
from cases of trespass to inheritance.191 
In both tort and criminal assault the master’s prerogative to whip 
the slave was virtually unquestioned.192 Since slave masters owned their 
slaves they could use or abuse their property as they saw fit.193 These 
cases did not question the appropriateness or proportionality of whipping 
in the circumstances, like workplace corporal punishment cases in the 
North did. Slaves were vulnerable to beating for a variety of infractions: 
drunkenness,194 insolence,195 running away,196 unsatisfactory work,197 or 
                                                     
 189. See generally CATTERALL, supra note 121. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See State v. Hale, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 582, 582 (1823) (explaining that while a master can 
be criminally indicted for assault and battery on his slave, “every battery on a slave is not indictable, 
because the person making it may have matter of excuse, or justification, which would be no defence 
for committing a battery on a free person.”); see also Jacob v. State, 22 Tenn. 493, 520 (1842) (“The 
right of the master to the obedience and submission of his slave in all lawful things, is perfect, and 
the power belongs to the master, to inflict any punishment on his slave, not affecting life or limb, 
which he may consider necessary for the purpose of keeping him in such submission, and enforcing 
such obedience to his commands.”). 
 193. Of course, the injured slave could not sue for his or her injuries. These cases may signifi-
cantly underrepresent the number of beatings that took place. These cases proceeded without the 
benefit of the victim’s testimony, in part because evidentiary rules prevented parties from testifying 
on their own behalf, and in part because many states prevented Blacks from testifying against 
Whites. 
 Free blacks who received beatings could file suit, and they did; but not in large numbers. Free 
blacks, who had been beaten, did not necessarily stay in the jurisdiction long enough to press charg-
es. Beatings of free blacks usually occurred outside the master-servant relationships, and hence, 
these suits provided the contemporary backdrop that tolerated social and racial violence more gener-
ally. 
 For suits involving free persons of color who had sustained beatings, see, for example, Talley 
v. Robinson, 63 Va. (1 Gratt.) 888 (1872); State v. Harden, 29 S.C.L. (1 Speers) 152, 154 (1832); 
Pepoon v. Clarke, 8 S.C.L. (1 Mill) 137 (1817). 
 194. Souther v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. (7 Gratt.) 673, 677 (1851). 
 195. Johnson v. Perry, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 569 (1841). 
 196. Puryear v. Thompson, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) 397, 397–98 (1844); Markham v. Close, 2 La. 
581, 581–82, 587 (1831). 
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malfeasance,198 and they could also be beaten simply to drive them to 
work harder to avoid the lash. Of course, in larger plantations, slaves 
could be beaten by overseers or drivers hired by their masters for those 
purposes.199 
There was no Weberian move—no attempt by the state to obtain a 
monopoly on violence by taking the whip out of the master’s hand and 
assigning it to an official who could moderate the blows. Instead, when 
corporal punishment gave rise to disputes in the southern courts it oc-
curred when there was a difference of opinion between white men about 
who could beat the slave. Only to a lesser degree was there any question 
about how severely a slave could be beaten. The question of severity sur-
faced only rarely: first, when a master had beaten a slave to death or sec-
ond, when someone other than a master did the beating, and in the course 
of examining that person’s legitimacy to do so, the court sometimes 
commented upon whether the beating had been done wantonly. 
As to the first, despite the master’s broad prerogative to beat his 
slave, it appears that the criminal law took the violence seriously enough 
to intervene at the point that the whipping resulted in the slave’s death.200 
The Virginia Court articulated the policy directly: 
It is the policy of the law in respect to the relation of master and 
slave, and for the sake of securing proper subordination and obedi-
ence on the part of the slave, to protect the master from prosecution 
in all such cases, even if the whipping and punishment be malicious, 
cruel and excessive. But . . . if death ensues in consequence of such 
punishment, the relation of master and slave affords no ground of 
excuse or palliation.201 
I found no reported instances of criminal prosecution for injuries 
which fell short of death of the victim. This left a tremendously broad 
range of intentionally inflicted violence virtually unregulated by law. 
                                                                                                                       
 197. Martineau v. Hooper, 8 Mart. (o.s.) 699, 700–02 (1820); Echols v. Dodd, 20 Tex. 190, 
194 (1857). 
 198. Cook v. Gourdin, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 19, 20 (1819). The man who steered the 
ferry boat “instead of exerting himself, in order to bring the head of the flat up, to stem the current 
again, left his pole and went to the stern of the flat, to chastise the helmsman; and did beat him for 
his inattention and carelessness. In the mean time, the current took the broadside of the flat, the 
hands threw down their oars and poles, and refused to make any further exertions.” Id. 
 199. When the primary purpose of striking the slave was to compel him to labor, masters 
sometimes preferred to do the whipping themselves so as to hide the scars of the flesh. Scars gave 
evidence of the enslaved person’s insubordinate nature that might lower his price in future sales. 
 200. See Echols, 20 Tex. at 197. A black boy who was hired to work in a sawmill was beaten 
so severely by the mill’s superintendent for the boy’s alleged misconduct that he died. The court 
held that the mill owner was responsible because the chastisement was done by the superintendent in 
the course of his employment. Id. at 194–97. 
 201. Souther v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. (7 Gratt.) 673, 680 (1851). 
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Death of the slave was the incident that required an explanation, a justifi-
cation, or a defense.202 
As to the second, beatings by third parties could conceivably be a 
tortious trespass or a criminal assault upon the master’s interest in the 
slave.203 The tortious assault was styled as a trespass on the property of 
the slave owner.204 In the civil dockets, the violence was regulated when 
the slave master sued someone who had beaten his slave without his con-
sent or in an unauthorized manner. Generally, one could not beat a slave 
without state authority or the master’s consent, but occasionally circum-
stances occurred, obviating even that.205 The issue of the beating’s justi-
fication also arose in cases where the slave was hired out to another mas-
ter,206 or in overseers’ employment contracts when overseers were termi-
nated because they whipped slaves too frequently. The assailant could 
then raise arguments of legitimation and justification. 
When the courts questioned the disciplining function of the beating, 
they were more likely to remark upon its purposelessness. For example, 
                                                     
 202. See MARK TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810–1860: CONSIDERATIONS 
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master.” Id. at 115. 
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well in trespass for beating his slave); Carsten, 16 S.C.L. at 115. “The injury of which the plain-
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Force committed on a slave, is . . . an immediate injury to the master.” Id. 
 205. Tillman v. Chadwick, 37 Ala. 317, 318–19 (1861). In the case of a person who hired a 
slave from his master to perform work, the court noted that “[a]bsolute obedience, and subordination 
to the lawful authority of the master, are the duty of the slave; and the master or hirer may employ so 
much force as may be reasonably necessary to secure that obedience.” Id. at 318. The court also 
noted that “the hirer of a slave, when there are no qualifying stipulations in the contract of the hiring, 
is, for the time being, armed with the power of the owner in this respect.” Id. “[T]he master, hirer, or 
overseer, should ever bear in mind, that the main purpose of correction is to reduce an offending and 
refractory slave to a proper state of submission, respect and obedience to legitimate authority” and 
“[t]his chastisement should be so attempted and applied as to secure the end aimed at, with as little 
risk of permanent injury or danger to the slave or his owner as is reasonably compatible with the 
surroundings.” Id. at 319. 
 206. Helton v. Caston, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 95 (1831) (regarding a trespass action for cruelly 
beating the plaintiff’s slave). The slavewoman had been hired to the defendant for twelve months, 
under a contract stipulation, that he was not to beat or abuse her; she was severely beaten by the 
defendant, and in consequence returned to her master. Id. The jury found for the plaintiff. Id. 
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in one case a court wrote: “The beating [of the plaintiff’s negroes, who 
had tickets] consisted in the infliction of about fifteen stripes with a 
whip. The negroes were at a store, on Sunday, behaving themselves 
peaceably and orderly; and the flogging was without any excuse, and 
done in mere wantonness of power.”207 In other cases, slaves with passes 
or full permission of their masters were whipped by patrols who refused 
to honor the master’s passes. In South Carolina, where patrols regulated 
slaves’ coming and going on the highways, there were incidents where 
the patrol assaulted African-Americans who were publicly seen too visi-
bly engaging in some liberty, such as being present at a store, attending a 
church meeting, attending a wedding, or a quilting bee, despite having 
tickets to do so from their masters.208 Slaves’ enjoyment of liberty had 
evoked in the white patrol the decision to repress them by beatings. 
Slaves’ ability to enjoy public space was clearly contested, even when 
their masters granted them that liberty. I say the ground was contested 
because masters could be motivated to sue either for the injury inflicted 
on their slaves by the whipping or for the affront that their duly issued 
tickets were not recognized.209 Thus, slaves were vulnerable to beating 
by a variety of individuals in addition to their masters and overseers. 
Slaves were beaten on the roads or in public for pass enforcement, inso-
lence, or lack of a properly submissive attitude.210 With the exception of 
a master beating his servant to death, whippings that reached the court’s 
notice were done with the purpose of maintaining racial dominance. 
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meeting house. They also caught several others near the house, whom they threatened, and were 
preparing to whip, but dismissed, on the entreaties of the defendant and the tears of a lady who inter-
ceded for them.”). 
 In Hogg v. Keller, the defendant, a patrol captain, and the others acting under his authority, 
whipped the plaintiff’s slave, who had a pass from his master. Hogg v. Keller, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & 
McC.) 113, 113 (1819). A witness said, each member of the patrol gave some stripes in the “usual 
mode of whipping by patrols.” Id. 
 In State v. Boozer, the jury convicted members of a slave patrol for unlawfully whipping Ri-
kart’s slaves who were attending a quilting with their master’s permission. State v. Boozer, 36 
S.C.L. (5 Strob.) 21, 21–23 (1850). In State v. Cole, the Court said: “A patrol is not authorized 
to . . . commence its operations by killing a man’s dogs[,] . . . carry them on by beating his negroes, 
and conclude with abusing himself.” State v. Cole, 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) 117, 123 (1822). 
 210. See Reid v. Colcock, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 592, 593 (1819). After someone “asked 
Frank, then a boy, to whom he belonged, and on his replying that he did not know, . . . [plaintiff’s 
father] gave him a severe chastisement, saying to him, he belonged to plaintiff, and desired that he 
might remember it for the future.” Id. 
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Slaves could also be the innocent victims of the masters’ battles be-
tween themselves.211 Slaves were uniquely vulnerable as thing-object 
representatives of their owners. Some slave beatings were occasioned by 
individuals who were not angry with the slave but were feuding with his 
or her master.212 When a feuding neighbor could not directly afflict his 
neighbor, the true object of his enmity, he could take it out on his neigh-
bor’s slave, who he was more likely to catch unawares and who he could 
command to come within striking range. Slaves sometimes found them-
selves pawns in these situations. In these scenarios, the whipping was 
purposeful rather than an act of random violence, but the purpose of the 
whipping was to do injury to the property of that master rather than to 
chastise the servant for anything that he or she could be accused of doing 
wrong.213 
In other instances, slaves’ beatings occurred because slaves found 
themselves in an uncertain command of authority either between persons 
of authority within the household or between their master and someone 
to whom they had been hired out. Contests for dominance within a 
household, between fathers and their adult sons, or fathers and their sons-
in-law, prompted a scramble for dominance in which the slaves took all 
the whacks. Both masters could order the slave to obey him. Whichever 
master the slave did not obey beat the slave for disobedience.214 
There was no question that slave masters could delegate the au-
thority to impose corporal punishment. There are a few cases where 
overseers went too far and were discharged for their over-zealousness. In 
these circumstances, the incidents find their way to court because the 
overseers sue for violation of their labor contract, urging that their con-
                                                     
 211. Sometimes a master is even drawn into disputes between his slaves and others. Grimke v. 
Houseman, 26 S.C.L. (1 McMul.) 131, 132 (1841) (defendant “undertook, by unauthorized violence, 
to redress the grievance of his own slave”). Masters sometimes whipped the slaves of neighboring 
masters because of enmity or dominance feuds between themselves. Hendrix v. Trapp, 31 S.C.L. (2 
Rich.) 93, 93 (1845). 
[W]hile the slave was pursuing the highway to a neighbor’s house, whither he had written 
leave to go from his master, the defendant met him, and struck him several severe blows 
over his head and arms with a hickory stick. A witness for the defendant testified that he 
heard the plaintiff admit that he had told the defendant, if he caught his negroes on his 
place to whip them, and that he, the plaintiff, was to do the same with the defendant’s ne-
groes. 
Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See Sally Greene, State v. Mann Exhumed, 87 N.C. L. REV. 701, 731 (2009) (stating that 
“the inherent conflict between owners and hirers often erupted into actual conflict, putting individual 
slaves at risk and posing a systematic risk to white solidarity”). 
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duct was justified. Or, the master sued the overseer for damages for the 
value of the slave who had been killed by the overseer’s abuse.215  
5. Whipping Blacks in the Antebellum South to Establish Racial        
Subjugation 
The rationale of class and race dominance allowed members of the 
general free white public, with no specific relation to the slave, to strike 
slaves. This expanded the class of persons who could exercise the pre-
rogative of whipping. This expansion of authority to exercise preroga-
tives of racial abuse was in stark contrast to the trend occurring in the 
North, where the right to strike a servant was a personal prerogative be-
longing only to the servant’s master. With southern slaves, however, the 
privilege could not only be transferred and delegated, it could also be 
exercised by members of the public out of a rationale that routine whip-
pings were necessary and useful to prevent slaves as a group from be-
coming insolent. 
This more broadly held collective prerogative of white persons to 
discipline slaves could sometimes be done even without the master’s ac-
quiescence. Masters who sued others for interfering with their slaves by 
whipping them without permission found themselves nonsuited. For ex-
ample, in Hervy v. Armstrong,216 the township patrol arrested the plain-
tiff’s slaves on their way home from an orderly and well-conducted Sun-
day religious meeting. The slaves were tied and whipped by the pa-
trols.217 The Court said the whipping was not cruel or excessive, though 
their cries and the sound of the blows were heard by persons at a dis-
tance.218 And, although the court found that the circumstances were ex-
asperating to the slave master, the court ultimately ruled against the 
plaintiff.219 
[I]t may be supposed the circumstances were such as to exasperate 
the plaintiff in a high degree. But he did not prove . . . any special 
damage . . . . 
. . . We apprehend the reason why the master cannot have a civil ac-
tion for the battery of his slave without special damage is, that it 
would encourage slaves . . . to be insolent . . . . The elevation of the 
                                                     
 215. Brunson v. Martin, 17 Ark. 270, 271 (1856); Craig’s Adm’r v. Lee, 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 
119, 119–20 (1853); Watson v. Hamilton, 40 S.C.L. (6 Rich.) 75, 75 (1852); State v. Raines, 14 
S.C.L. (3 McCord) 533, 533–34 (1826). 
 216. Hervy v. Armstong, 15 Ark. 162, 164 (1854). 
 217. Id. at 165. 
 218. Id. at 165–66. 
 219. Id. at 169. 
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white race and the happiness of the slave, vitally depend upon main-
taining the ascendency of one and the submission of the other.220 
The whip was used as a way to keep order at this border and preserve 
this hierarchy. 
Ever the apologist for slavery, Georgia legal commentator Thomas 
Cobb articulated the same reason: the potential insolence of slaves. 
Reasons of policy and necessity . . . require that so long as two races 
of men live together, the one as masters and the other as dependents 
and slaves, to a certain extent, all of the superior race shall exercise 
a controlling power over the inferior. If the slave feels that he is 
solely under the power and control of his immediate master, he will 
soon become insolent and ungovernable to all others.221 
Cobb explained that various police and patrol regulations gave “to white 
persons other than the master, under certain circumstances, the right of 
controlling, and, in some cases, correcting slaves. But if the white person 
exceeds the authority given, and chastises a slave who has given no 
provocation, he is liable for the trespass.”222 
However, in State v. Stephenson, the Texas court sustained an in-
dictment for an assault and battery upon a slave.223 The court stated that 
slaves were to be regarded as persons under the criminal law, because, 
“[u]pon the contrary hypothesis every white person would have prima 
facie the right to whip any slave; . . . a principle not recognized either by 
the public opinion and usage, or by the laws of the country.”224 Similarly, 
a court ruled that “to no white man does the right belong of correcting, at 
pleasure, a free negro.”225 At first blush this ruling looks progressive. At 
least, until the court stated the following: 
The only difference in the law . . . seems to me to consist in the dif-
ferent justification which would excuse an assault and battery on the 
one or the other. Free negroes belong to a degraded caste of socie-
ty . . . . [T]hey ought, by law, to be compelled to demean themselves 
as inferiors, . . . words of impertinence . . . addressed by a free ne-
gro, to a white man, would justify an assault and battery. As a gen-
eral rule, . . . whatever, in the opinion of the jury, would induce 
                                                     
 220. Id. at 166–68. 
 221. THOMAS R. R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA. TO WHICH IT IS PREFIXED, AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF SLAVERY 106 (Negro 
Universities Press, 1968) (1858) (second emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 222. Id. (citing Caldwell v. Langford, 26 S.C.L. (1 McMul.) 275 (1841)). 
 223. State v. Stephenson, 20 Tex. 151, 153 (1857). 
 224. Id. at 152. 
 225. State v. Harden, 29 S.C.L. (2 Speers) 152, 154 (1832). 
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them, as reasonable men, to strike a free negro, should, in all cases, 
be regarded as a legal justification in an indictment.226 
Of all these instances, the greatest up-turn of the racial hierarchy 
was considered the most serious social and legal infraction, that is if a 
free person was whipped by a slave. This threatened the greatest humilia-
tion for a free man.227 Thus, the beating of slaves must be seen as a par-
ticular circumstance of public display of violence for the purposes of ra-
cial subjugation that endured long beyond the prerogative of employers 
to physically chastise other servants. Northern whites rallied around the 
possible threat that physical chastisement would spread to white, work-
ing-class statuses. But, in fact, even by the late 1830s, this manifestation 
of violence adhered strongly to the racial divide directed at a race of 
people who were considered inferior.228 As Elizabeth Clark writes, 
“[O]nly in the thirty years before the Civil War did reformers mount an 
aggressive and highly public assault on violence as a tool of governance 
in the master-slave relationship.”229 
C. Other Sites Where the Practice of Whipping Was Acceptable 
As Blackstone’s rule eroded with regard to most servants, and beat-
ings maintained legitimacy with regard to slaves of African descent, the 
authority to use corporal punishment against subordinates still remained 
in force in certain pockets. The practice increasingly became associated 
with the marginal labor done by less dignified persons in the laboring 
schema: children, wives, slaves, sailors, and finally criminals.230 Alt-
hough this Article’s focus is on the demise of workplace chastisement, it 
is useful to see the arguments of legitimacy that were occurring in the 
margins as the rule splintered. 
                                                     
 226. Id. at 155 (emphasis added). 
 227. Paige v. Smith, 13 Vt. 251, 251 (1841). The court stated that “the plaintiff had made fre-
quent and violent threats . . . that he would way-lay the defendant, beat, flog, and whip him, and that 
he would hire some negro to whip him.” Id. 
 In Stachlin v. Destrehan, 2 La. Ann. 1019, 1021 (1847), the court stated that the outrage upon 
the plaintiff was not only without excuse, but was the “most ignominious to which a free man can be 
subjected” when the plaintiff was whipped on the defendant’s order by the defendant’s slave. Stach-
lin v. Destrehan, 2 La. Ann. 1019, 1021 (1847). 
 228. “This theory of the dominant and subordinate standings of different races contributed to 
the belief, widely held in the nineteenth century, that racial groups differed in their physiological 
responses to pain.” Clark, supra note 12, at 474. Clark’s excellent article demonstrates how Aboli-
tionists had to first persuade their audiences that persons of African descent were fully sentient in 
order to make the larger humanitarian argument that slavery was wrong. 
 229. Id. at 464. 
 230. Jonathan M. Gutoff, Fugitive Slaves and Ship-Jumping Sailors: The Enforcement and 
Survival of Coerced Labor, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 87, 88 n.9 (2006). 
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Setting workplace chastisement in its context still requires setting 
the comparison in two other social contexts: punishment for crime and 
military discipline. The degree to which whipping is deemed to be social-
ly acceptable as punishment for a crime provides a basis for normalizing 
the practice in the master-servant context. Similarly, the degree to which 
whipping is deemed socially acceptable in the military for officers cor-
recting or punishing their subordinates provides another point of refer-
ence. 
1. Beating Sailors and Soldiers 
Corporal punishment was considered acceptable longer in the mer-
chant marine, the navy, and the army.231 The distinctions made here 
seemed to rest on the premise that the well-being of the ship or “the ship 
of state” was at risk if the slightest insolence was not immediately 
squelched. Other times the shipboard practices were viewed as legitimate 
because the ship or the institution was a world of its own. For example, 
in 1839, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia considered the beating of a ship’s cook and concluded that a “blow 
with a dirty frying pan” levied against the person whose duty it was to 
keep those articles clean was not an aggravated or cruel assault.232 The 
court explained that “[n]obody will believe that the law which governs 
the deportment of men on shore to each other, can be applied to their 
habits and conduct on board of a ship.”233 As Jonathan M. Gutoff has 
written, even though most maritime labor was free, “by entering into a 
particular voyage, a seaman subjected himself to labor discipline more 
severe than any other type, with the exceptions of slaves and men in the 
army and navy. The vessel’s master could discipline a seaman through 
confinement or beating.”234 
Congress finally abolished flogging in the Navy in 1850 in a series 
of steps that paralleled the sequence that took place in workplace cor-
poral punishment.235 The Navy first sought to measure the instances of 
flogging, and subsequently required reports and justification.236 Eventu-
                                                     
 231. Id. 
 232. Forbes v. Parsons, 9 F. Cas. 417, 420 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1839) (No. 4,929). 
 233. Id. at 419. 
 234. Gutoff, supra note 230, at 101–02 (citing RICHARD B. MORRIS, GOVERNMENT AND 
LABOR IN EARLY AMERICA 262–63 (1946)). In the sailing trade, the case of Robertson v. Baldwin 
continued the marginal treatment of sailors by permitting the recapture of fleeing seamen. 165 U.S. 
275 (1897). 
 235. See Act of Sept. 28, 1850, ch. 80, 9 Stat. 513, 515 (appropriating money for the Navy to 
provide mail service with the proviso that “flogging in the navy and on board vessels of commerce, 
be, and the same is hereby, abolished from and after the passage of this act”). 
 236. GLENN, supra note 40, at 128. “In 1840 President Van Buren further regulated the practice 
of naval corporal punishment by requiring the navy to make quarterly reports on the subject.” 
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ally, in 1850, the Senate narrowly passed a law outlawing corporal pun-
ishment in the Navy. The voting pattern followed the sectional overtones 
of the anti-corporal punishment campaign with the majority of senators 
who voted to abolish coming from northern states.237 
While the United States Army routinely used whipping as a pun-
ishment for soldiers who had been duly court-martialed,238 there was a 
deeper question about whether army officers could summarily beat their 
soldiers for insolence. This summary action was thought to quickly rein-
force the hierarchical order between officer and soldier. A sharp immedi-
ate response was extremely useful when insolence threatened insurrec-
tion. The official response, though not to condone the practice, was to 
treat it with ambivalence. 
In two parallel incidents, occurring between 1832 and 1842, two 
young lieutenants reacting almost instinctively, beat insolent soldiers 
under their command with their canes.239 These young men were reacting 
the same way that masters had traditionally responded to their servants’ 
disrespect. (Canes were the instrument army officers carried at the 
time.240) Was this conduct legitimate in the Army’s eyes? The Army 
lacked clear rules about how a junior officer was to respond to insolence 
by soldiers under their command.241 The army’s treatment of each young 
officer demonstrates ambivalence on the subject.242  
The legitimacy of their respective actions was tested when each of-
ficer was subjected to a court-martial for his deed.243 The Army sent 
                                                                                                                       
Id. The reports had to “stat[e] the names of the persons punished, their offences, and the extent of 
punishment inflicted, together with such explanations or remarks as the commanding officer may 
deem necessary.” Id. “[N]avy officials sought to mollify public opinion against flogging by regulat-
ing and restricting th[e] practice.” Id. 
 237. Id. at 130. 
 238. “Flogging was the most frequently prescribed corporal punishment in the Legion, and its 
use was common in civilian law at that time as well.” Bradley J. Nicholson, Courts-Martial in the 
Legion Army: American Military Law in the Early Republic, 1792–1796, 144 MIL. L. REV. 77, 87–
88 (1994). 
If a soldier was caught sleeping at his post and found guilty, he could be whipped up to 
100 times, forced to walk the gauntlet, or shot. The indeterminate, almost whimsical na-
ture of sentencing in the Legion was a rational combination of terror reinforced by unpre-
dictability. The military court thus selectively singled out certain men for exemplary pun-
ishment and hoped to frighten the rest into proper behavior. 
Id. at 86–87. 
 239. LEA VANDERVELDE, MRS. DRED SCOTT: A LIFE ON SLAVERY’S FRONTIER 125, 357 n.41, 
208–09 (2009). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Both officers were West Point-trained and well-trained in the culture and formality of 
military hierarchy. Id. at 208; Thomas W. Cutrer, Smith, Edmund Kirby, TEX. ST. HIST. ASS’N, 
https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fsm09 (last visited Apr. 4, 2016). 
 242. VANDERVELDE, supra note 239, at 208. 
 243. Id. 
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mixed signals in both cases about whether “caning” insolent soldiers was 
legitimate or not. In Lieutenant Smith’s case, the court-martial declared 
his actions to be a breach of conduct and discharged him from the Ar-
my.244 But, the norms were not set.245 So a few years later, on his peti-
tion, Lieutenant Smith was reinstated to his former place in the same unit 
as if nothing had happened. What explained this turn-about? In the inter-
vening years, the generals had reversed their position on the matter.246 
In Lieutenant Buell’s case, the court-martial initially excused him 
only to have the lenient decision reversed on appeal. On appeal the gen-
erals thought that Buell deserved punishment.247 The panels split about 
whether the practice was permissible. Buell’s superiors held strong but 
contradictory beliefs about whether the conduct was legitimate, but the 
numbers split almost evenly. The case ended in a draw.248 Thus, the issue 
was not definitively resolved. 
During this period, flogging was still acceptable punishment for se-
rious infractions, like desertion, after a duly administered court-martial. 
Yet, flogging was eventually banned in the Army before the Civil War249 
only to be reinstituted as a permissible practice during the Civil War.250 
                                                     
 244. Id. at 126. This was viewed as a tragic but necessary end to an otherwise promising career 
of a young man raised in a military family. 
 245. In the procedure by which incidents like this were tested, the U.S. Army Generals prom-
ulgated rules only after the norms had settled. This occurred in a manner that was something like the 
common law. A court-martial was sent to a higher officer for approval, and it could be appealed yet 
higher. The rule on the matter could only really be ascertained when all appeals had ended and the 
issue had been resolved. 
 246. E. Kirby Smith’s entry in Cullum’s Register describing his military career says “Dis-
missed, Oct. 6, 1830, for Inflicting Corporal Punishment on Mutinous Soldiers, and Reinstated, Apr. 
26, 1832.” 1 GEORGE WASHINGTON CULLUM, BIOGRAPHICAL REGISTER OF OFFICERS AND 
GRADUATES OF THE U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY AT WEST POINT, N.Y. FROM ITS ESTABLISHMENT, IN 
1802, TO 1890 WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY 386 (3d ed. 
1891). 
 247. VANDERVELDE, supra note 239, at 208. Unlike Lieutenant Smith’s entry, Lieutenant 
Buell’s entry in Cullum’s Register does not even mention his infraction or the subsequent court-
martial because he was not convicted in the court-martial, despite the prolonged complaints of high-
er-ups on appeal that he should have been. 2 CULLUM, supra note 246, at 95. 
 248. The debate spun off into a debate over which set of officers had authority to make the call 
in this case. The debate only ended when the President of the United States called it to a close by 
viewing the debate as squabbling between his officers. 
 249. Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 54, § 3. 
 250. Herbert L. Meschke & Ted Smith, Judicial Values: The Justice Robinson Experience, 82 
N.D. L. REV. 25, 28 n.24 (2006). 
 [Robinson’s] only reference to the Civil War that we have found was this fragment 
in an editorial he wrote condemning conscription for military service in World War I: 
Even in our day and generation, poor white soldiers were tied to posts and 
flogged on the bare back with a rawhide by order of snobbish, well-paid offic-
ers. And it would not be far amiss to say that they were flogged because of be-
ing poor and ill-paid. If the soldiers had received a man’s pay of $100 a 
month, then there would have been no flogging and no Bull’s Run. 
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2. Beating in Civil Society as Punishment for Crime 
In the eighteenth century, flogging criminals as punishment for 
their crimes was a standard penal measure in many American communi-
ties. Thereafter more established communities built prisons and shifted 
from floggings to incarceration during the early decades of the 1800s. 
There were still whippings carried out within prison, but the advent of 
the prison meant that whipping ceased to be the primary sanction. During 
the 1830s and 1840s American society turned away from corporal pun-
ishment, in part as a result of public campaigns.251 Campaigns against 
corporal punishment in Northeastern prisons and schools animated a 
change in popular opinion.252 During this decade, “the total amount of 
corporal punishment, especially floggings, administered in Northeastern 
penitentiaries declined in the latter half of the 1840s.”253 
The whipping post endured longer on the American frontier. Whip-
ping had particular usefulness because frontier communities could ill-
afford to build prisons, let alone guard and feed prisoners for extended 
periods of time. So, the expediency of whipping delivered the punish-
ment, communicated the severity of the sanction to the convicted and the 
community, and allowed the community to move on.  
Residents were self-conscious of this connection. One wrote: “As 
characteristic of the period, we note that the punishment for crimes, ow-
ing to the want of prisons, were generally of a summary character: Death 
for murder, treason, and arson (if loss of life ensued therefrom); whip-
ping with 39 lashes, and fine, for larceny, burglary and robbery . . . .”254 
Thus, although it was not mandated by state or territorial law, municipal-
ities could set up whipping posts where the whipping would be publicly 
done.255 
                                                                                                                       
In Robinson’s view, conscription was an unconstitutional taking of a person’s right to the 
fruits of his labor.  
Id. (citation omitted). 
 251. There must have been something about the decade of the 1830s. Michel Foucault identi-
fies this decade as the end of sensational public whippings in town squares in Europe. He stated that 
“[b]y 1830–48, public executions, preceded by torture, had almost entirely disappeared. Of course, 
this generalization requires some qualification.” MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE 
BIRTH OF THE PRISON 14 (1977). 
 252. GLENN, supra note 40, at 146. 
 253. Id. at 132. One particularly striking fact is that “the average number of lashes per month 
declined from 1,121 in 1843 to 38 in 1847.” Id. at 133. 
 254. ALEXANDER DAVIDSON & BERNARD STUVE, A COMPLETE HISTORY OF ILLINOIS FROM 
1673 TO 1873, at 213 (1874). 
 255. Regarding whipping posts and pillories, Timothy Walker writing in 1837 from Ohio said: 
“I may here add, however, that corporal punishment, by whipping, pillory, and the like, though not 
prohibited, is now seldom resorted to.” WALKER, supra note 103, at 182. Walker’s rationale for 
preferring incarceration to whipping was instrumental rather than humanitarian: 
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Yet, after the 1830s, it appears that even frontier communities were  
abandoning the practice and instituting prisons. In Michigan, whipping 
was specifically authorized by territorial statute in 1815, and subsequent-
ly repealed in 1831.256 The timing was similar on the Canadian side of 
the border.257 
In Illinois, already a state by the 1830s, Governor John Reynolds 
was instrumental in eliminating the use of whipping as punishment for 
crime.258 Illinois had a criminal code with itemized numbers of lashings 
for itemized crimes, but it had no prison. To switch from corporal pun-
ishment to incarceration, the cash-strapped state of Illinois had to build 
one. 
                                                                                                                       
[I]mprisonment is more efficient . . . since it physically disables the offender, for the time 
being, from continuing his depredations upon society. The man who has been whipped or 
fined, is forthwith let loose upon society, with the power, and probably a disposition 
sharpened by exasperation, to repeat his transgression. But the man who is immured be-
tween prison walls, cannot do harm.  
Id. at 425–26. 
 256. Farmer wrote: 
An Act of the Governor and Judges, passed July 27, 1815, provided that any justice of the 
peace might order the whipping of “lewd, idle, or disorderly persons, stubborn servants, 
common drunkards, and those who neglect their families, with ten stripes, or the hiring of 
them out for three months at the best wages that can be secured, for the benefit of the 
poor fund.” The first sale under this Act took place at auction about the middle of Sep-
tember, 1818, when twenty-eight shillings were paid for the services of one bad citizen. 
In the summer of 1821 the services of a drunken white vagabond were bought by a black 
man for ten days, for the sum of one dollar. The whipping was performed at the old mar-
ket on Woodward Avenue below Jefferson. The law was repealed March 4, 1831. 
SILAS FARMER, THE HISTORY OF DETROIT AND MICHIGAN, OR, THE METROPOLIS ILLUSTRATED; A 
CHRONOLOGICAL CYCLOPAEDIA OF THE PAST AND PRESENT, INCLUDING A FULL RECORD OF 
TERRITORIAL DAYS IN MICHIGAN AND THE ANNALS OF WAYNE COUNTY 190–91 (1884). 
 “I remember seeing the whipping post, that was close by the market, but I never saw anyone 
whipped there, nor do I think any unfortunate underwent that ordeal after 1826.” FRIEND PALMER, 
EARLY DAYS IN DETROIT 311 (1906). 
 257. Read opined: 
In 1789 a local Court of Common Pleas was organized, having both civil and criminal ju-
risdiction. Appeal lay to the Governor, and the Council and the Judges were selected 
from among the wealthier citizens, who whipped, branded, banished, and imprisoned, as 
their caprice or the state of their digestive organs dictated. It thus seems that the branding 
was in fashion in Detroit in 1789, when Detroit was still in possession of the British and 
part of the District of Hesse. 
DAVID B. READ, THE LIVES OF THE JUDGES OF UPPER CANADA AND ONTARIO, FROM 1791 TO THE 
PRESENT TIME 22 (1888). But for the history in Missouri, see HARRIET C. FRAZIER, SLAVERY AND 
CRIME IN MISSOURI, 1773–1865 (2d ed. 2009). 
 258. In his memoir, Reynolds writes: “I had reflected on the subject of punishment of crimi-
nals, and. had reached the conclusion that the criminal law should be changed, and that the ancient 
barbarous system of whipping, cropping, and branding for crimes, should be abolished and the peni-
tentiary substituted.” JOHN REYNOLDS, REYNOLDS’ HISTORY OF ILLINOIS 172 (1879). See generally 
Hannah Margaret Graber, The Last of the (Legal) Lash: Illinois Abolishes Whipping Posts (2015) 
(paper submitted in completion of The Law of the Frontier, University of Iowa College of Law) (on 
file with author). 
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Reynolds’s solution was to build a penitentiary and pay for it by the 
sale of public land which he persuaded the legislature to do. Yet, Illinois’ 
criminal code then had to be rewritten, equivalences and proportionality 
worked out. This process took even longer than building the house of 
corrections. As late as 1853, the Illinois legislature felt it necessary to 
reiterate their abolition of whipping as punishment for crime in supple-
mental legislation.259 
Reynolds explained the transformation as a “humane provision: ‘the 
object of punishment is reformation, and not for extermination.’”260 In-
carcerating in buildings that were going to be called “Houses of Correc-
tion” was in keeping with the “spirit of the age,”261 according to Reyn-
olds. Reynolds was a trained lawyer, not really an intellectual, yet his 
choice of words draws close to Kent’s own language.262 
Although the antebellum frontier abandoned whipping posts in “the 
spirit of the age,” free Blacks continued to be whipped, sometimes for 
minor infractions.  Just across the river from the Illinois penitentiary, two 
decades later in the 1850s, the St. Louis city council enacted an ordi-
nance requiring that all free Blacks be licensed. Although the enforce-
ment was often lax, when the ordinance was enforced, the punishment 
for failure to obtain a license was subjecting the unlicensed free Black 
person to flogging and then expulsion from the state.263 No one in St. 
Louis at the time publicly expressed the sentiment that free Blacks 
should not whipped for this minor infraction because whipping was in-
consistent with “the spirit of the age.” 
III. THE SEQUENCE AND ITS LEGACY 
Thus, workplace corporal punishment ended quietly, lacking the 
political uplift of any widespread affirmation directed at workers’ inter-
ests in respect and fair treatment. What began as a commonly recognized 
prerogative of masters over everyone in their workshop household was 
altered by some states that attempted to curb masters’ vindictiveness and 
the most extreme mistreatment. These regulations targeted at whippings 
required that masters have reasons, limited the number of lashings, and 
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even sometimes assigned a neutral to carry out the punishment. In later 
cases, the legal discourse changed, first, by declaring that the prerogative 
was personal and hence, not transferable and next by declaring that it 
was not delegable. As workplaces grew in scale, requiring several layers 
of supervisory personnel, the old doctrine of correction could not be 
stretched to authorize intermediate authorities to impose correction on 
their subordinates. The rule splintered into subcategories. The subcatego-
ries that remained subject to the rule were exceptions to the new norm. 
Although in the North the rule’s scope of application narrowed, in 
the South the scope broadened to allow an entire class, free white men, to 
inflict corporal punishment on slaves for mere insolence. Slave masters 
could continue to inflict corporal punishment even for vindictiveness, 
provided the slave was not killed. In its expansion it became a method of 
racial oppression rather than workplace discipline. When slavery was 
finally abolished, the well-known mechanisms of the “Wheel of Servi-
tude” and Jim Crow emerged to become substitute forms of racial domi-
nation.264 
How did workplace corporal punishment reach its quiet end? Per-
haps with a substitute: the at-will doctrine. In the 1870s at the time that 
treatise writers were ready to declare that masters could no longer strike 
their servants, there was a ready replacement. Masters could expel work-
ers from the workplace, not only for sufficient reason, but under the pre-
dominant at-will rule even for reasons of vindictiveness or no reasons at 
all. Intermediate managers gained the right to fire workers with impunity. 
The livelihood of the worker hung precariously on a string that could be 
severed by his employer at any moment.  These legal developments left 
us without legal accountability for workers’ grievances and a pervasive 
and enduring belief that flight is the solution to workplace abuse.  
The Supreme Court later recognized a significant foundational 
truth: “When the master can compel and the laborer cannot escape the 
obligation to go on, there is no power below to redress and no incentive 
above to relieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of 
work.”265 Yet instead of providing redress for such overlordship, the 
American legal system responded in the late nineteenth century simply 
by liberalizing the right to “escape the obligation to go on.” Employees 
were accorded the right to quit while at the same time in a world where 
there is generally a shortage of jobs and an abundance of workers, em-
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ployers received a much more powerful sanction—the prerogative to fire 
employees at will.266  
In essence, the legal system seemingly obviated judicial involve-
ment in workplace grievances by simply liberalizing flight. As a conse-
quence, the American legal system has never developed a tradition of 
reviewing workers’ grievances or actually penalizing an employer’s 
overreaching. The remedy for abusive employment was and still is simp-
ly to leave. And in leaving, one forfeits one’s stake in the enterprise; and 
grievances are left unresolved, unreviewed, and unaccounted for.  Thus, 
in a sense, the history of workplace corporal punishment leaves a legacy 
for modern employment law. In the present day, when working people 
experience grievances or overreaching abuses, they find little justice by 
going to court. The law tacitly assumes that terminating the employment 
relationship is not the cataclysmic (and for the worker perhaps cata-
strophic) end of the escalating workplace dispute. It is viewed, instead, as 
the full remedy. 
Of all the progress narratives, Richard Morris’s explanation that 
justice for the working man is “precariously dependent upon a fortuitous 
conjunction of the humanitarian impulses and economic interests of 
those in power”267 seems most plausible. What employers gained served 
their interests better than what they lost. 
And who was the last legally beaten servant in America?268 That 
question can’t be answered. The categories shifted. It depends upon how 
one interprets the words, “servant” and “legal.” The term “servant” had 
originally applied broadly, generically, but the term disaggregated by 
repeated comparison with other categories of laborers. As Blackstone’s 
rule narrowed to apply to only more marginal categories of unfree labor, 
the last legally beaten servant was probably an African-American slave 
or a seaman under American jurisdiction.269 And in the case of African-
American slaves, the purpose was less likely to have been for workplace 
discipline, than for a different dominance objective. 
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